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They were truly the guests from hell.1
I. INTRODUCTION
There are no general principles2 of international environmental law3 that require
an occupying4 power to take responsibility for the environmental harms 5 suffered
1. See Julian Borger, Guests from Hell Leave a Huge Clean.up Bill: The Last Russian Troops In Estonia
Have Finally Gone But Julian Borger in Paldiski Discovers that It Is Still Much to Early to Breathe a Sigh of Relief,
The Guardian Foreign Page, Sept. 2,1994, available in 1994 WL 9289288 (quoting Julian Borger in her reference
to 50 years of Russian occupation in Estonia).
2. See EDrrH BROWN WEISS Er AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVmON N rAL LAW AND PoucY 188 (1998)
(stating general principles are recognized in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute).
3. See id (relating that general principleso f international law are not to be confused with general principles
of law). General principles is loosely defined as those common elements of all, or nearly all, domestic legal systems.
Id. Thus, even though general principles of international law refer to the rules of customary international law,
general principles may be assumed to also pertain to the international domain. Id Therefore, general principles of
international environmental law are those general principles and general principles of international environmental
law, that specifically pertain to the customs and norms in respect to the environment Id. at 509-526.
4. See BLACKS's LAW DIcrONARY 1079 (6th ed. 1990). Black's states occupation is "[t]he act or process
by which real property is possessed... where a person exercises physical control over land." Id. Occupation
defined in this Comment is when one nation installs their military regime as well as instilling their government upon
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by the occupied territory. This is unfortunate because an occupying power often
exploits the natural environment of the occupied country. For example, when the
Republic of Estonia (Estonia),6 declared independence in 1991 from the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), severe environmental damage was discovered
as a result of their occupation.7 Two cities in Estonia provide the best examples of
the mass destruction the USSR occupation reaped on their environment. A former
Soviet uranium mill in Sillamie, contains a lake of radioactive waste, which is
threatening to leak into the Baltic Sea.8 In the city of Paldiski, the land surrounding
the former Soviet naval base is inundated with radioactive nuclear waste, oil, and
metals.9 The damages the USSR caused the Estonian environment is evidence that
general principles of international environmental law must be applied to an
occupying country to preserve and protect the occupied territory.
General principles gained recognition as a source of law under Article 38(1)(c)
of the Statute of International Court of Justice (ICJ).o The statute provides the court
is to apply general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." The
definition of "civilized nations" is no longer applicable to general principles of
international law today.12 This statute was created in the early 1900s, when not all
nations had governments and laws in place. Today, most countries have
another nation, thus becoming an occupying power of another territory not their own.
5. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (6th ed. 1990). Environment is defined as the totality of physical,
economic... factors which surround and affect the desirability and value of property.... Id. Harm is defined as
the existence of loss or detriment in fact of any kind.., resulting.from any cause. d at 718. Thus, environmental
harm is the damage and subsequent loss of any kind that occurs to the physical property or economic value of land.
6. See FEDERALRESEARCHDISONLRARYOCONGREss,EsO1ALATVIA, DLrWANCOUNRY
STUDIEs 3 (Walter R. Iwaskiw ed., 1996) [hereinafter ESTOnIA COUNTRY STUDY] (describing Estonia as a country
slightly larger than Vermont and New Hampshire combined); see also Departing Russians Leave Environmental
Headaches in Baltics, CHi. TRIB., Aug. 31,1994, available in 1994 WL 6480196 (stating Estonia is about the size
of Vermont); see also Jon Henley, Estonia is Left a Toxic Legacy Russian Troops in Baltic Pullout *Scandals taint
Chernomynlin* NATO offers bond, THEGUARDIAN FOREIGN PAGE, Sept 27,1995, available in 1995 WL 9936639
(comparinjg Estonia's total area of 45,226 square kilometer(s) to the size of Switzerland, with a population of 1.5
million people).
7. See Sections H.B. and Il. (detailing the extent of environmental harm to Estonia from the Soviet
occupation).
8. See generally notes 185-208 and accompanying text (describing the Sillamle uranium dump and the
radioactive waste pool).
9. See generally notes 154-84 and accompanying text (detailing the extent of damage surrounding the
former Soviet naval base in Paldiski).
10. See Statute of the ICJ. Art. 38(1)(c), 59 Stat. 1055 (1945). For a complete definition of Art. 38(1)(c) see
U.N. CHARTER app. 707 (3rd ed. 1969). "The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: ... the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations...."
11. Statute of the ICI, Art. 38(1)(c), 59 Stat. 1055 (1945).
12. See REBECcA M. M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (1992) (explaining "civilized nations" is no
longer considered applicable in today's international community).
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governments and laws in existence, therefore nullifying the term within the
statute." Hence, what is meant by general principles?
General is an arbitrary concept, grasping what is commonly recognized in both
international and municipal legal systems and the major legal systems of the
world.14 For example, a state's responsibility not to cause transboundary harm is a
commonly recognized principle applied by the ICJ and international tribunals."S The
ambiguous meaning of "general" allows national laws to change and remain
applicable with the times. 16 Therefore, since there is no universal definition of what
general principles are their application in international law is not impeded by
external restraints.
17
International law' s has rapidly evolved and reformed in the past couple of
decades. Today, nations are inserting recognized general principles of law in their
international agreements. These changes in international law and the recognition of
general principles are evidenced by the increasing membership in international
agreements, treaties and conventions. 9 Countries to these international agreements,
are applying their own general principles of law recognized within the international
agreement upon their actions. In the United Nations Environmental Programme
13. See BROWNWEIss EAL., supra note 2, at 188 (remarking that "civilized nations" refers to those states
which have an organized legal system).
14. See WALLACE, supra note 12, at 22-23 (stating what is understood in today's international community
as general principles).
15. See Trial Smelter, (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Apr. 16,1938 & Mar. 11, 1941). Other examples
of commonly recognized principles have been established in. Temple Case, ICJ. Rep. 1962, p. 6 (recognizing the
principle of estoppel) and Chorzow Factory Case (Indemnity) (Merits), 17 P.C.IJ. Rep. ser. A, (1928) at 29.
16. See WALLACE, supra note 12, at 22 (observing that ambiguity is advantageous in the definition of
general principles of law); see also PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 19 (1992) (discussing the indefinite meaning of general principles).
17. See WALLACE, supra note 12, at 22-23 (explaining further the importance of no external restraints in
the application of general principles).
18. International law is not subject to a finite black letter rule of law definition, as it changes and conforms
meaning with the changing of times. Webster's dictionary has found the exception, see WEBsER'S SEVENM NEW
COLLEGIA"EDICTIONARY443 (7th ed. 1971) (defining the term of intemational law as, "a body ofrules that control
or affect the rights of nations in their relations with each other). For a legal definition, see BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 816 (6th ed. 1990). Black's Law Dictionary defines international law as, "[tihose laws governing the
legal relationship between nations" d.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS §101 (1986),
codifying international law as: "Rules and principles of general application dealing with the conduct of nations and
of international organizations and with their relations inter se as well as with some of their relations with persons,
whether natural or juridical." Id.
19. See generally notes 301 & 305 (citing several membership agreements, treaties, and conventions
recognizing general principles of international law).
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(UNEP), 20 general principles of good faith 2 and due diligence 2 are acknowledged
in the right to a protected and healthy environment from transboundary harm.23 The
application of these principles to an international agreement creates recognizable
general principles of international law among all signatory nations. However, since
the UNEP is non-binding, the general principles articulated within the agreement
are not restricted in their ability to change application and meaning, therefore
remaining in touch with the law at the time in question. The principle of not causing
transboundary harm was first announced as a general principle of international
environment law with the promulgation of Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration.24 Principle 21 embodies a State's sovereign right over their own
resources, but also the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction do not cause transboundary harm.' Twenty years later, during the Rio
Declaration, this principle was reaffirmed.' However general principles of
international law may be defined, their importance in international law can be
gauged when they are recognized and applied by nations to their responsibilities
regarding the environment. 27
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration have been widely accepted and adopted in numerous treaties,
conventions and agreements, leading to their acknowledgment as general principles
20. See Declaration ofthe United Nations Conference on the Human Environment June16, 1972, Principle
21, U.N. Doc. A/C, 48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 LL.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
21. See BLACK'S LAW DICrnOXARY 693 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "good faith"as: "... [A]n intangible and
abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an
honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage, and
an individual's personal good faith is concept of his own mind and inner spirit, and, therefore, may not conclusively
be determined by his protestations alone"). ld.
22. See P.M. Dupuy, International Law and Pollution, in INTERNATONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POUCY 337 (Edith Brown Weiss et al., 1998) (stating that due diligence is "the measure of international
responsibility") [hereinafter P.M. Dupuy]; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 457 (6th ed. 1990) (defining due
diligence as: "such a measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and ordinarily
exercised by, a reasonable and prudent man under the particular circumstances; not measured by any absolute
standard, but depending on the relative facts of the special case"). Id.
23. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20, at princ. 21 (establishing the principle of refraining from
causing transboundary harm).
24. See P.M. Dupuy, supra note 22, at 333-34 (articulating the duty not to cause substantial harm through
transboundary pollution in the area under the jurisdiction of another State is deemed to have been expressly
accepted in many treaties and agreements of States; thus recognizing Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration as
a general principle of international law).
25. 1lt at 334 (reporting the obligation of prevention among States exists only to the extent that the risk of
causing international environmental damage is reasonably foreseeable).
26. See generally notes 304-14 and accompanying text (analyzing the Rio Declaration as ageneral principle
of international law).
27. See generally note 305 and accompanying text (listing the agreements which have recognized Principle
21); see also P.M. Dupuy, supra note 22, at 334 (elaborating on the reaffirmation of the substance of Principle 21
by several international bodies).
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of international environmental law.28 The general principles of good faith and due
diligence in international law are to be upheld when applying these declarations to
the environment. These principles are observed together with a state's duty to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States, or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."
Recognition of these general principles creates a responsibility within a state not to
cause transboundary harm.3°
The duty not to cause transboundary harm was first recognized as a general
principle of international law in 1941 in the case of Trail Smelter.31 Here the
Tribunal held that a State owes at all times a duty to protect other States against
injurious acts by individuals from within their jurisdiction.3 2 This holding was
adopted in the Stockholm and Rio Declarations as the general principle of
international law to refrain from causing transboundary harm.3 Furthermore, this
principle has been adopted in two recent cases by the World Court,3 as well as
several recent treaties.35 These recent adoptions lend credibility to the duty not to
cause transboundary harm as a fundamental principle of international environmental
law. From these decisions and treaties (one may conclude) a responsibility exists
for all states to act with due diligence and good faith in not causing transboundary
harm? 6
28. See generally note 305 and accompanying text (citing the agreements which have adopted the general
principle to refrain from causing transboundary harm, recognized in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration).
29. See P.M. Dupuy, supra note 22, at. 334 (relating that states must take due care in upholding the
fundamental principle to refrain from transboundary harm).
30. See BROWN WEISS Er AL, supra note 2, at 239 (defining transoundary harm as "where the activities
of a state (state of origin) in its territory create pollution that causes damage to the territory of another state" (the
affected state)).
31. See Trial Smelter, (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Apr. 16, 1938 & Mar. 11, 1941). This case
originated from the damage caused in the State of Washington by sulphur dioxide emitted since 1925 from a smelter
plant at Trial on the Columbian River, 10 miles from the United States/Canadian border on the Canadian side. See
also BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 89-90 (discussing the general holding of the Trial Smelter case). The court
awarded the U.S. tribunal awards for the damages to the environment resulting from air polluting emissions out of
a Canadian smelter, Id. at 90. Furthermore, the court concluded that "no state has the right to use or permit the use
of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another." I at 90 & n. 39.
32. See BIRNm & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 90 & n. 39 (restating the holding from the Trial Smelter case).
33. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20, at princ. 21.
34. See The Advisory Opinion for Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ 226 (July
8, 1996); see also Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of The Court's
Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), 1995 I.CJ. 288 (Sept. 22, 1995).
35. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, International Environmental Law, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, 504,504.09 (BROWN Wass Ur AL, 1998) (listing several treaties which have
adopted the principle to refrain from causing transboundary harm established in principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration).
36. See Trail Smelter, supra note 15, at 1965. [No State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory
in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein,
when the case is of serious consequences and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
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State responsibility refers to liability of one state to another for the non-
observance of the obligations imposed by general principles of international law. 7
When due diligence is not observed and transboundary harm occurs, that state has
breached its responsibility in observing general principles of international
environmental law.38 A breach of this type may occur for injury to the defendant
state's nationals or their property. In the case of Estonia, Russia's occupation and
subsequent environmental damage upon the land caused severe environmental harm
to Estonia, as well as causing transboundary harm throughout the Baltic Sea.3 9 Thus,
because of Russia's occupation of Estonia and subsequent damage to the
environment; Estonia and neighboring countries of the Baltic Sea are suffering from
environmental harm.' Therefore, Russia as the occupying power of Estonia has
breached its responsibility to refrain from causing transboundary harm to another
state.41
A State has the responsibility to ensure that activities within their control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States.42 Russia controlled Estonia during
its fifty years of occupation.43 Therefore, Russia is responsible for the
environmental harm they caused by the oil and nuclear material in Paldiski and the
radioactive waste lake in Sillame, which in return have caused transboundary
damage to the Baltic Sea." Therefore, this principle is applicable to hold an
occupying power responsible for causing environmental harm to Estonia and
subsequent transboundary damage to the neighboring States of the Baltic Sea.
This Comment focuses on the case of Estonia as an example of why applying
general principles of international environmental law is necessary to hold an
occupying power responsible for environmental damage. Part II of this Comment
reviews the history and policies of the former USSR's occupation of Estonia and
the subsequent environmental damage the occupation had to the land and the Baltic
37. See McCaffrey, supra note 35, at 504, 505-07 (discussing state responsibility for non-observance of
general principles of international law).
38. See Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, Forms of International Responsibility for Environmental Harm, in
INTERNATONALRESPONSIBuYpORENVIRNMENTAL HARM (Francioni & T. Scovazzi eds., 1991), reprinted in
BROWN WEISS E" AL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 511 (1998) (explaining the duty of due
diligence as a state responsibility in observing the principle to refrain from causing transboundary harm) [hereinafter
Pisilo-Mazzeschi].
39. See infra notes 150-90 and accompanying text (explaining how the environmental harm and pollution
of Sillamle and Paldiski is endangering the health of the Baltic Sea).
40. See generally infra notes 154-208 and accompanying text (presenting the damage to the environment
in the cities of Paldiski and Sillamle and how they are threatening the waters of the Baltic Sea).
41. See Stockholm Declaration, supa note 20, at princ. 21 (establishing the principle to refrain from causing
transboundary harm).
42. See generally notes 294-312 and accompanying text (defining the principle to refrain from causing
transboundary harm established in principle 21 of the Stockholm and principle 2 of the Rio Declaration).
43. See ESTONIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 18, 24 (stating the era of Soviet occupation began in
1940 and ended in 1991, with Estonia's reestablishment as an independent state).
44. See generally inha notes 150-190 and accompanying text (laying out the damage to both Paldiski and
Sillamle which both lie on the coast of the Gulf of Finland that turns into the Baltic Sea).
1999 / International Responsibility of an Occupying Power
Sea.45 Part II examines the impact the USSR's occupation had upon the
environment by looking at the destruction, and cost of reparation of two Estonian
cities.4 Part IV discusses the scope and applicability of general principles of
international environmental law and the fundamental duty not to cause
transboundary harm. Part V begins by analyzing the enforceability of the Troop
Withdrawal Agreement, specifically as to whether Estonia waived its right to hold
Russia responsible for the environmental harm. Disregarding the fact that Estonia
may have waived its right to hold Russia responsible, this Comment will apply the
general principles of environmental law as recognized under the Stockhom 47 and
Rio Declaration 4s to the environmental damage in Estonia. Specifically, Part V
analyzes the responsibility of Russia as an occupying power under the general
principle of international environmental law to refrain from causing transboundary
harm for the environmental damage of Estonia. Part VI concludes, the application
of the duty not to cause transboundary harm under general principles of
international environmental law is necessary to hold the occupying power
responsible for environmental harm to the occupied territory.
II. THE HISTORY OF SOvIET OCCUPATION IN ESTONIA
World War II (WWII) was the most environmentally devastating war ever. The
warbrought mass environmental destruction to many countries, including Estonia.4
At one point during WWI the Soviet army bombed several cities along the Narva
river, in Estonia, destroying everything in sight, while attempting to regain control
of Estonia from the Germans.' Compacting the effects from the environmental
destruction of WWII, Estonia lost their independence and became an occupied
territory of the USSR.51
45. See generally Enn Otsa, Military Environment <http:l/www.ciesin.ee/ESTCG
/NATURE/ENVIRONMENT93/Militay..Env.html> (visited Jan. 18, 1999) (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (presenting a detailed report of the damage to the Estonian environment from the 50 years of Soviet
occupation) [hereinafter Osta].
46. ISd; see generally notes 125-208 and accompanying text (detailing the harm to the Estonian land).
47. SeeStockholmDeclaration,supmnote20, atprinc. 21 (establishingthegeneralprincipleofinternational
environmental law to refrain from causing transboundary harm).
48. See Rio Declaration of 1997 UN Conference on Environment, Principle 2, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992)
(reaffirming the general principle of international law established in principle 21 of the Stockholm
declaration)[hereinafter Rio Declaration].
49. See generally Rymn James Parsons, The Fight to Save the Planet: US. Armed Forces "Greenkeeping,"
and Enforcement of the Law Pertaining to the Environmental Protecting During Armed Conflict, 10 CEO. INT'L
ENVrL IL REV. 441,462-466 (1998) (relating the environmental damage which occurs during armed conflict).
50. See Soviet Occupation, (1940-91), EsT. COUNTRY GUIDE (visited Feb. 21, 1999)
<http'J/www.ciesin.ee/ESTCG/HISTORY/History3.html> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(explaining the history of the Soviet - Russian occupation of Estonia from 1940-1991).
51. See ESTONIACOUNTRYSTUDY, supra note 6, at 18.
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Estonia lost their independence in 1939 with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet
Nonaggression Pact,52 which divided Eastern Europe between Hitler and Stalin.53
The secret protocol within the Pact gave Stalin possession of Estonia.' Stalin,
threatening force unless Estonia acquiesced to occupation,55 wanted to use the
Estonian territory as a buffer to protect mainland Soviet Union from an attack by
northern Europe.5 By June of 1940, the Soviet forces had completely occupied
Estonia.? In their efforts to protect mainland USSR, the Estonian environment
suffered massive destruction by the Soviet military preparing for a possible attack.
Soviet oppression increased when the Soviet military established blockades on
Estonian air space and territorial waters.58 As a result of the blockade, more Red
Army troops entered Estonia, occupying close to 570 military bases across
Estonia.59 Briefly from 1941 to 1944, the Soviet occupation of Estonia was
interrupted during which the Germans defeated the Soviet forces. But at the end of
WWII, the Soviet Union re-occupied Estonia.6°
During the next 50 years of the USSR occupation, the USSR contaminated
Estonian land by using it as a testing ground for nuclear power.61 Other by-products
of the USSR's occupation was its manufacturing of toxic waste,62 dumping of jet
fuel into the soil,63 and unexploded missiles littered on islands off of the Pakri
52. See id (explaining that the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, was also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact); see also Estonian History in Brief (1940-1991), ARTs & HUMANITIES (visited Feb. 3, 1999)
<http'//www.ibs.eeibs/history/brief/brief3.html> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (detailing that the
Pact between Hitler and Stalin was signed on August 23, 1939).
53. See ESToNIACOUNTRYSTUDY, supra note 6, at 18.
54. Seeid.
55. See Estonian History in Brief (1940-1991). supra note 52 (claiming after the threat of force by the
USSR, Estonia signed an agreement in September, which resulted in 25,000 Red Army soldiers being brought into
Estonia); see also ESTONIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 18.
56. See Eastern, Central Europe: Baltics Optimistic Soviet Damage to Environment can be Reversed,
WORLD ENV'T REP., Dec. 21, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2519610 (stating how the Soviet Union used Estonia
during WWH as a buffer to protect the mainland).
57. See ESTONIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 18 (stating Stalin alleged that Estonia had violated the
terms of the mutual assistance treaty, therefore he was justified in occupying Estonia).
58. See Soviet Occupation (1940-91), supra note 50 (proclaiming direct aggression by the Soviets against
Estonia began with the blockade).
59. See Environmental Clean Up After 50 years of Soviet Russian Military Occupation Will Cost Over Four
Billion USD, ESTONIA REV. (Aug. 18-21,1994) <http.//www.vm.ee/eng/review/1994/94er1921.08e.hnl> (visited
Feb. 14, 1999) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
60. See generally ESTONIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 17-24.
61. See Otsa, supra note 45 (detailing the danger of radioactive pollution from the radioactive waste lake
at the former uranium facility in Sillamne and from the two nuclear reactors in Paldiski).
62. See id. (accounting that 20 tons of napalm was left unguarded in Mnniku and large amounts of smoke
bombs, ignition mixtures, and chlorine picrine were left in storage at the Tapa airfield).
63. See id (explaining that the Tapa military airfield has fuel immersed in the soil polluting most of the
surface under the town); see also Environmental Damage From the Soviet-Russian Military Occupation, ESTONIA
TODAY (visited Jan. 18, 1999) <http://www.ciesin.eeESTCG/NATURF94milenv.09i> (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (detailing the surrounding area of the airfield is contaminated with dumped fuel two to eight
meters deep).
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Peninsula." As a result of the USSR's exploitation of the Estonian environment in
favor of industrialization, 6 billions of dollars must now be spent to restore the
contaminated land left damaged by Soviet troops.66
After Estonia declared its independence in 1991,0 the government requested
compensation for the cost of cleaning up the environmental damage wrought from
the Soviet military occupation. 68 However, Russia refused to claim responsibility
or pay for any clean up costs.69 There are several reasons why Russia refused to
compensate Estonia 70. One reason is that Estonia and Russia signed the Troop
Withdrawal Agreement in 1994.71 In this Agreement Russia claims the no-liability
clause denounces any responsibility for the environmental disaster on Estonian
soil. 2 A second and more practical reason, is that Russia does not have the financial
capacity to pay for the clean up costs.73 Thus, for the next couple of decades Estonia
will carry the burden and cost of cleaning up the cities and areas devastated with
environmental damage from the Soviet occupation.74
64. See Otsa, supra note 45 (verifying nearly 1,000 hectares of land on Pakri Island has been denuded by
bomb craters). At the Utsala artillery range the bombing has destroyed approximately 500 hectares. IU The flora
and fauna surrounding the other artillery ranges has been obliterated by fires, shell and bomb craters, and trenches.
Id. In addition there are large quantities of unexploded mines surrounding the bases. Id
65. See ESTONIAN COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 18-22 (discussing the Soviet's mission of
industrialization).
66. See CIS the Costs of the Soviet Occupation's Environmental Damage Released, ESTONIA REv. (Oct. 25-
27, 1993) (visited Jan. 18, 1999) <httpI//www.vm.eelsearcb/oop/afulh...Jsearcheng.html&CiHilite~ype=Full>
(copy on file with The Tnsnationai Lawyer) (estimating that in 1993 the cost of the environmental damage cause
by the Soviet military as 15.28 billion kroons (US$1.15 billion) during their fifty years of occupation).
67. See ESrONIAN COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 19-22. In 1989, the USSR broke up into individual
Republics. Id The Republic of Russia, retained control of the Baltic States, one of which was Estonia. Id. Thus,
in 1991, Russian troops were occupying and controlling Estonia. IC
68. See Estonia Doesn't Expect Russia to Pay for Environmental Damage, BALTIC NEWs SEmV., Dee. 1,
1998, available in 1998 WL 20198615 (acknowledging that Estonian official believe it is unlikely that Russia will
compensate for any of the environmental damage). Officials also verify it isin't known if anyone has ever sought
officially to have Russia compensate for the environmental damage. Id.; see also Borger, supra 1 (citing Mart Laar,
the'Prime Minister of Estonia, who admitted that he did not expect the Russians to pay for the environmental
damage).
69. See generally Estonia Doesn't Expect Russia to Pay for Environmental Damage, supra note 68
(reporting that Russia has neither compensated the other post-socialist countries for the environmental damage after
withdrawal of its armed forces).
70. See Departing Russians Leave Environmental Headaches in Baltics, supra note 6 (proclaiming that
Russia has refused to compensate the Baltics for the environmental damage).
71. See infra notes 312-41 and accompanying text (discussing the Soviet-Russian & Estonia Troop
Withdrawal Agreement).
72. See Borger, supra note I (stating that the Estonia government plans to send a bill for the environmental
damage, even though the Troop Withdrawal Agreement included what appeared to be a waiver on such claims).
73. See generally notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing Russia's unwillingness to pay for
environmental damage, which also lends to the conclusion that Russia's financial situation can not compensate for
all the damage their occupation caused).
74. See Estonia Drawing up List of Environmental Damages Caused by Russian Troops, ESTONIA REV.
(Sept. 20-26,1993) (visited Feb. 14,1999) <http'J/www.vm.ee/eng/review/1993/93092026.html> (copy on file with
The Tansnational Lawyer) (relating that most of the assistance for cleaning up the damage is coming from Finland,
Sweden, Norway. Denmark and Germany).
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Hypothetically, if the USSR had never occupied Estonia, its government would
be focusing largely on maintaining a strong economy and government, 75 instead of
cleaning up the massive environmental destruction left by Soviet military forces.!6
There are no guarantees that the Estonian environment would be healthy today. But
in the 1940's Estonia was still a newly independent nation concentrating primarily
on a strong economy and stable environment7 when the nuclear reactors were built
in Paldiskig and the Uranium facility in SillamK .e 9 Therefore, it is more than likely
that Estonia would not have had the capitalm as a young nation to build such
facilities which contributed substantially to the massive environmental devastation
within Estonia and to the Baltic Sea. 1
A. 1918-1940-A Newly Independent Nation Establishing a Strong Economy and
Stable Government
Estonia shares its eastern border with Russia, its southern border with Latvia,
and its northern and western side with the Baltic Sea.' Throughout its history
Estonia has been occupied and controlled by its surrounding neighbors. 3 At the fall
of the tsarist regime in 1917, Estonia had its first glimpse of independence for the
75. See generally ESTONIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining the history
of the Estonian government and their process to create a stable economy after declaring independence in the
1920's).
76. Id.
77. See Estonian History in Brief (1918-1939), ARTS & HUMANITIES
<http://www.ibs.ee/ibs/history/brief/brief2.html> (visited Feb. 3, 1999) (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (discussing the Estonian economy, internal politics and culture afterindependence); see also Independence
(1920-1940), EST. COUNTRY GUIDE <http'J/www.ciesin.ee/ESTCG/ISTORY/-istory2.html> (visited Feb. 21,
1999) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (detailing Estonia's strive to create a strong economy and
establish a stable government after declaring independence in the 1920's).
78. See The Paldiski Nuclear Facilities: A Precedent in International Cooperation, EST. TODAY (1995)
(visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http.//www.vm/ee/engestoday/1995/9509pal.html> (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (reporting that the first nuclear reactor was built in 1964 and the second one in 1979).
79. Environment Body Pats SillamdJe Radioactive Deposit on 'Hot Spot' List', BALtIC NEWS SERV., May
25,1998, available in 1998 WL 8548800 (stating that the uranium plant in Sillanrne was originally built in 1948).
80. See generally Independence (1920-1940), supra note 77 (discussing the instability of the Estonian
government and economy after their declaration of independence from the Soviet Union).
81. See generally notes 154-214 and accompanying text (summarizing the damage to the environment from
the Paldiskd and Sillamrie facilities).
82. See EU/Baltic States: Three MoreAssociation Partnersforthe EU, EUR. REP., ISSN: 1021-4267, Feb. 7,
1998, available in 1998 WL 8800528.
83. See ESTONIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 12 (explaining throughout the 700 years of history,
Estonia has been subject to the occupation of many of the surrounding Baltic countries).
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first time in over 700 years.8 Following the end of World War I, Estonia first
declared its independence as a nation on February 24, 1918.8
The first twenty years of independence was impacted by the Soviet Union
seeking to regain control and occupy Estonian land once again. During the first
two years of independence Estonia was constantly at war against both the Russian
Bolsheviks and the Baltic German forces.' By the end of 1919, because Estonians
had grown weary of the constant struggle for independence approximately two-
thirds of Estonia was back under Soviet occupation and control.8r In a last effort to
retain their independence, Estonians counter-attacked and freed the land the Soviets
had re-occupied.88 Soviet occupation continued through the autumn of 1919, and on
February 2, 1920, the Tartu Peace Treaty was signed, wherein for the first time the
USSR recognized the independence of Estonia as a country8 9 For the next couple
84. See id. (detailing the 700 years of foreign rulers). During the 1200's, the Estonians were under control
of German crusaders seeking to impose Christianity upon them. ld. The Estonians were finally conquered by the
Teutonic Knights in 1227. Id Later the Danes moved in and invaded Estonia from the north and together with the
Germans they settled down as nobility, and Estonians over time were subordinated as serfs. Id Later in the 1300s
Estonians staged an uprising forcing the Danes to relinquish their control to the Germans. l The Germans ruled
Estonia for the next two centuries without much war. Id. In the 1500s, Ivan IV (the Terrible) invaded the Baltic
region in 1558; engaging Sweden and Poland in a twenty-five year struggle for control. l at 14. Russians nearly
wiped out the forces of the Teutonic Knights, but Swedish and Polish intervention reversed the Russian gains and
force Ivan eastward. Id By 1629, Sweden eventually won most of the territory. Id Under Swedish rule the land
of Latvia was divided into what is now Estonia and Latvia. l Northern Estonia was incorporated into the Duchy
of Estland, and the southern part into Latvia. Id. This division of the countries lasted until 1917. d During Swedish
control the German based nobility retained and strengthened its position, but the Estonian peasants situation
worsened. d In the 1700s, Peter I (the Great) attempted to conquer Estonia, but failed. d Peter I's second attempt
to conquer Estonia ended with victory for Russia in 1710. Id. This victory was Russia's acquisition of a "window
to the West," Id Tsarist Russia for the next 200 years recognized the rights and privileges for the local German
nobility, although under Catherine II (the Great), the Baltic Germans developed a strong loyalty to the Russian tsars
and guarantors of their landed privileges. Idat 14-15.
85. See id. at 15-20. Estonia's first declaration of independence came around the turn of the twentieth
century, when Estonians were fast developing an independent grasp on society and their nation. Id The Estonian
culture began awakening in the 1850s and 60s. d Finally in the early 1900s political demands for Estonian
autonomy found strong expression during the Revolution of 1905, which ended with the organization of an All-
Estonian Congress. Id. In November of 1917 the Bolsheviks took over Petrograd, Russia as well as Estonia, until
Germany occupied Estonia in February of 1918. Id. at 16. When the Bolsheviks retreated and the Germans entered
Tallinn, the Committee of Elders (or standing body) of the Maapaev declared the country independent on February
24, 1918. ld; See also, Amy L. Elson, Baltic State Membership in the European Union: Developing a Common
Asylum and Immigration Policy, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 317, 322 (1997); Cord Meyer, Estonia's critical
role in Europe The WASH. TIMES, A; Commentary, Apr. 12, 1996, available in 1996 WL2951817. See also,
EU/Baltic States supra note 82 (explaining that the former USSR had occupied Estonia since 1780).
86. See Estonian History in Brief (1918-1939), supra note 77, at 86. After the collapse of Germany in
November 1918, the Estonian provisional government assumed power. Id. The, former USSR attacked Estonia In
an attempt to conceal the aggression of the Estonian people and gain control of the newly independent state. l
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. See id; see also Elson, supra note 85, at 317. At the end of WWI, the Tartu Peace Treaty was signed.
Moscow agreed to relinquished all claims to Estonia in perpetuity. d Later that year Estonia's first constitution
was proclaimed, establishing a parliamentary system. Id.; see also Estonian History in Brief(1918.1939), supra
note 77. In September of 1921 a year after USSR released control of Estonia, it gained international recognition
from the Western powers and became a member of the League of Nations, joining all international political
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of decades, Estonia struggled to create a strong economy and stable government. 90
This struggle to create a strong economy, government and environment was upset
by the beginning of WWII.9 Before Estonia could celebrate this new found freedom
and establish a strong government, Estonia was annexed by the Soviet Union during
WWll.
92
B. 1940-1989--Soviet Control
In the beginning of 1939, Estonia began to lose their tenuous grasp on
independence. By August of 1939, Nazi Germany and the USSR had signed the
Soviet-Nazi Non-Aggression Pact.93 This Pact divided Eastern Europe into spheres
of influence.9' According to the Pact, Estonia became part of the USSR's sphere of
influence.95 Pursuant to the Pact, Stalin threatened to take forceful measures against
the Estonian people and their land, if the USSR was not allowed to install their
military regime upon Estonian land. Reluctantly, the Estonian government signed
the Pact with the USSR. As a result of signing the Pact, USSR was given the right
conventions and agreements. IiL
90. See ESTONIAN COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 16 (explaining that prior to independence, Estonia
relied heavily on the Russian market, but Soviet communism closed this channel by 1924, weakening the Estonian
economy). Estonia economy began to grow slowly, but was further set back by the onslaught of the Depression,
which affected Estonia during the early 1930s. Id By the late 1930s Estonia had expanded its industrial sector
employing many Estonians which strengthened Estonia's economy. Id at 16-17. Political parties were divided fairly
equal between left and right wings causing many problems. Id. at 17. Furthermore, the first Estonian constitution
required parliamentary approval of all major acts taken by the prime minister and his government, thus the State
Assembly could dismiss the government at any time, without incurring sanctions. Id Furthermore, independence
in the early years was characterized by instability and frequent government turnovers. Id A total of twenty-three
governments held office from 1918 to 1933. I Due to Estonians ever changing control and an imbalanced
constitution, led to the weakening of their political system. Id. In 1934 as the country was gearing for a presidential
election, prime minister, Konstantin Pits, organized a preemptive coup d'itat on March 12, 1934, because of the
prospect of a league victory and possible fascist rule. 1d Pits ruled with the army by decree until 1940. To secure
his control Konstantin Pitts, suspended the parliament and all political parties. Id This period was known as the
"Era of Silence." Id By 1936, Pits initiated the election ofa new assembly and an adoption of a new constitution.
Id Pits kept complete control only allowing his political party, the National Front, while all others remained
suspended. Id In 1938, Pits, was elected President by the new parliament. Id at 17-18.
91. Seeid at 18.
92. See id.
93. See Soviet Occupation (1941-1991), supra note 50 (stating that the pact is also called the Hitler-Stalin
Pact).
94. See ESTONIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 18. Soon after the pact was signed, the Soviet Union
pressured the Baltic States into signing the Pact, which would allow Moscow to station troops in Estonia. Id
President Pitts, was in ill health at this time and acceded to every Soviet demand. Id.; see also Datesfomm the history
of Estonia, ARTS & HUMANmEs, (visited Feb. 3, 1999) <httpJ/www.ibs.eeibshistory/dates.html> (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) (mentioning that on August 23 of 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was signed
between the USSR and Germany, dividing Eastern Europe between Hitler and Stalin).
95. Estonian History in Brief (1940-1991), supra note 52 (relating that the secret protocol gave USSR
control of Estonia).
1999/International Responsibility of an Occupying Power
of occupation.96 By June of 1940, the Red Army had completely occupied Estonia."
Under Stalin's regime and political maneuvering, the Estonian people were forced
to accept the installation of a pro-Soviet government.98
Soviet control of Estonia was short-lived when in July of 1941 the Germans
invaded. 9 From 1941-1944'00 Estonia witnessed further repression under German
control.01 Altogether, from 1939 to 1945 Estonia lost over 20 percent of its
population due to the turmoil of the Soviet and German expansionism for industrial
purposes, deportation of radicals and eradication of the Jewish population. 1°2 By the
end of 1944, with Germany losing WWII, the Soviet Red Army led a successful
invasion of Estonia, forcing the German forces to retreat back to Germany. 103 After
the end of WWII, the Sovietization °4 of Estonia resumed with the former USSR
occupying and taking control of Estonia."°
For the next fifty years, the Soviet's single-minded dedication to building up
their defense to protect the Soviet Union from an attack' 6 resulted in an
environmental disaster of epic proportions.10 All land inhabited by the Soviet
96. See id. By signing the agreement with the USSR, 25,000 Soviet Red Army soldiers arrived in Estonia.
Id At the time of the Red Army's arrival, Estonia's army was only 15,000 men. Id
97. See idU By the summer of 1940, the USSR delivered an ultimatum to the Estonian government
demanding that a new government be appointed and more Red Army troops be allowed into Estonia. 14
98. See ESrONIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 18. At this time the Estonian Communist Party emerged
from underground and organized a list of eligible candidates to run. Id. On July 21, the new parliament declared
Estonia a Soviet republic and requested admission into the Soviet Union. Id Admission was granted by Moscow
on August 6, 1940. Id.; see also Estonian History in Brief(1940-1991), supra note 52 (discussing that on July 21,
the new parliament proclaimed the formation of the Estonian SSR, and nationalized industry, banks and the
land-with no compensation being offered). By forcing a new parliament upon Estonia and implementing their own
laws, as part of their totalitarian state, Estonia was no longer able to develop as an independent nation. 1d The new
parliament ceased all contracts with other States, as well as centralizing the economy leaving Estonia independent
upon Moscow. 1d.
99. See ESTONIAN COUNTRY STUDY, Supra note 6, at 19.
100. See Dates from the History of Estonia, supra note 94 (relating that from 1941-1944 approximately
5,000-5,500 Estonians were executed in concentration camps); see also Estonian History in Brief (1940-1991),
supra note 52.
101. See ESToNA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 19; see also Estonian History in Brief(1940-1991),
supra note 52. Estonian hopes were dashed when they realized that the Germans were not going to restore the
independence of the Republic of Estonia. Id. Instead Estonia became part of the Ostland province of the Reich. ld.
Furthermore, the economy was subjugated to the interests of the Reich, and nationalized property was not returned.
'l
102. See id.
103. See Estonian History in Brief(1940-1991), supra note 52.
104. See id. Sovietization, first began in 1940, which ignored the interests of the Estonian society, continued
in 1945. Id. Specific policies, aimed at restricting the role of Estonians in society, as well as restricting Estonian
culture, were soon also implemented. it.
105. See ESTONTAN COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 19.
106. See Eastern, Central Europe: Baltics Optimistic Soviet Damage to Environment Can Be Reversed, supra
note 56.
107. See id (disclosing among the environmental damage visited upon the military sites in Latvia, Lithuania,
and Estonia, the dismantling of the two nuclear reactors at the former navy base in Paldiski, Estonia, has the
potential of an environmental catastrophe).
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military during their occupation of Estonia was catastrophically exploited.0 8 For
example, the Tapa air force base is so inundated with jet fuel that it has seeped into
the ground 25 feet below."° This damage to the soil has spread into the water
supply of the city making it undrinkable. ° At the scrap metal dump in Tammiku,
a man was killed when he uncovered improperly stored radioactive waste after
breaking into the dump."' Not only was the environment catastrophically damaged
to build the USSR's military, but it was also deleteriously used to build a strong
economy.
After the end of WWII, the Soviet Union rebuilt Estonia's war-ravaged
economy by exploiting the natural resources and environment for the purpose of
industrializing Estonia as a component of their centrally planned economy.112 By
the 1980s, Moscow managed more than 90% of Estonian industry. 3 But, due to the
Sovietization philosophy of ignoring the environment and land, all possibilities for
even more extensive industrial development was exhausted because the
environment was destroyed."' The condition of the environment deteriorated
further because of the large-scale production.1 5 When the last attempt to intensify
the economic development failed, the growing shortage of food, industrial goods
and services.
During the 1980s, because the environment was virtually exhausted and unable
to adequately support continuing industrialization, the USSR's interest in Estonia
lessened. This lead to the general stagnation of Soviet control over Estonia
weakening to such an extent in the late 1980s that Estonia began to see the first
108. See id. (discussing the land used by the Soviet Military in Estonia will require full-scale remediation);
see also Uranium Dump Perils Estonian Sea, Cf. TRIB., May 23,1993, available in 1993 WL 11073517 (detailing
that an iceberg of deadly uranium waste has piled up over the decades in the seaside Estonian lake in Sillame,
which is enough to cause a disaster in the Baltic Sea).
109. See Environmental Damage From the Soviet-Russian Military Occupation, supra note 63 (specifying
that 16 square kilometers surrounding the Tapa airport has been contaminated by dumped fuel to a depth of two
to eight meters).
110. See id The ground is so heavily saturated with dumped fuel that the drinking water is rendered
undrinkable. Id.; see also Lisa Trei, No Celebration: As Last Russian Troops Leave, Estonians Tum to Legacy of
Problems-Damage to the Environment, Disrupted Fuet and Trade Top a Challenging Agenda, WALL ST. 3. EUR.,
August 31, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2037337 (stating the water at the airport is flammable).
111. See also Mark Hibbs, Estonia Combatting [sic] Wave of Trafficking in C.-137 Sources, NUCLEONICS
WEEK, Oct. 8, 1998 available in 1998 WL 9822259 (relating that in 1994, one man died from radiation burns after
breaking into a scrap metal dump at Tammiku, near Tallinn).
112. ESTONIA COUNTY STUDY, supra note 6, at 19-20. With Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev's
liberalization of economic reform and consumerism in the 1960s also touched Estonia's enviroment. Id.
Agricultural collectivization was enforced, industrialization of all available natural resources was enforced and the
Estonian Communist Party was purged and replaced by Russified Estonians. Id at 20.
113. See Soviet Occupation (1940-1991), supra note 50.
114. See Estonian History in Brief(1940-1991), supra note 52.
115. See Soviet Occupation (1940-1991), supra note 50.
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glimpses of regaining independence. t1 6 By 1987 Estonia began seizing opportunities
to reclaim their independence.117 Protests by Estonian citizens began over a
proposed project that would have seriously damaged the environment." 8 These
protests pressured for economic reform, which lead to the 1988 "singing
revolution."1 9 The following year, Estonia had disabled the political sovereignty
and economic autonomy of the Soviet Union." °
For the next couple of years, Estonia pushed to retake control of their own
country and remove the Soviet army from occupying their land.' In their effort to
regain control, Estonians bega4,to discover the extensive damage and degradation
of their environment.12 One such example that the environmental damage to the
land was causing health problems arose in 1989. In a short period over 300 cases
of hair loss and other illness among children in the town of Sillam~ie occurred.' 3
Three years later in 1992, there was still no reason or cause to explain the hair
loss.124 Four governmental investigating commissions failed to find a cause, but
investigators now believe that the uranium enrichment facility, specifically the
radioactive waste pool lying outside the facility, in Sillamiie contaminated the water
the children drank causing the problems.'2 Contributing to this belief was a study
116. See ESTONANCOUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 20. In the late 1960s, younger members ofthe Estonian
community began to raise the question of social democratization. Il At the end of the 1970s, in an effort to control
the Estonian uprising, the former USSR began to increase the importance of the Russian language, and restrict the
use of Estonian. IL
117. See id, at 20. With the dawning of glasnost (a Russian term for public discussion of issues; accessibility
of information so that the public can become familiar with it and discuss it) and perestroika (means restructuring)
the Soviet Union, under the control of Mikhail S. Gorbachev, began a period of liberalization which they never
recovered from. Id. Seizing upon this Estonian citizens began protesting against the Soviet run government. 1l
118. See Estonian History in Brief(1940-1991), supra note 52. The glasnost policy together with perestroika
enabled Moscow to inform the public of their plan to lay the groundwork for new phosphorite mines in Estonia.
Il Mining in this areas would have resulted in an ecological catastrophe as well as another influx of migrants. L.
These dangers united the Estonian people, creating massive protests, leading to the first political demonstration.
d
119. See ESTOIAN COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 20-24; see also The Restoration of Estonian
Independence, AiR & HUMANTms (visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http'//www.ibs.eeib/history/restoration.html> (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting June of 1988 marked the beginning of the "singing revolution").
The singing revolution began at the annual Tallinn city festival when it turned into several all-night songfests in
which thousands of people of all ages waved national flags and sang patriotic rock songs composed by Alo
Mattiesen and others. IL
120. See EsrONIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 21.
121. See Soviet Occupation (1940-1991), supra note 50 (relating that from 1989-1991 after civil society was
restored, free press was established, political parties were formed, several formerly prohibited associations and
organizations were restored, and society became more open).
122. See Uranium Waste May Have Caused Estonian Health Problems, NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS BUS. PUB.,
May 7, 1992, available in 1992 WL 2677448; see generally, infra notes 138-46 and accompanying text
(documenting the cost of the Soviet-Russian occupation to the Estonian environment).
123. See Uranium Waste May Have Cause Estonian Health Problems, supra note 122.
124. See id.
125. See id. (concluding that the contamination from the uranium enrichment facility in Sillamle built in 1948
may be causing the problems). Originally, the facility was built to extract uranium from radioactive oil shale. Id
The wastes created from the enrichment process were disposed in a pool 20 meters deeps and two miles wide that
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showing the air and land surrounding the facility is contaminated by radioactive
dust from the pool, with radiation levels near the site reading five times the normal
background levels."n This discovery was just a foreboding sign of the
environmental damage yet to be realized from the Soviet occupation.
C. 1991-Today-Cleaning the Environmental Damage From the
Soviet-Russian Military Occupation
In 1989 with the Soviet Union collapsing, Estonia's trail towards independence
began. 1" Two years later after many political protests and strengthening of the
Estonian movement, Estonia regained its independence from Russia in 199 1.1 The
fifty years of occupation and control by the Soviet-Russian military in Estonia has
taken its toll on it's environment.'" When the Russians pulled out, they had
instructions to take everything back.130 Unable to take everything, or sell it, the
military either destroyed or dumped what was left. 131 Thousands of tons of
poisonous chemicals and outdated ordinances were dumped in the sea. 132 The rest
of the military-industrial waste that was not sold or destroyed was simply left
behind for the Estonian government to clean up.133
The pollution left behind was also poured into the ground."M Examples of this
pollution can be found in the damaged ground water in some places so heavily
polluted with dumped aircraft fuel1 35 that it is possible to set the earth on fire, to
radioactive slurry ponds situated just meters from the Baltic Sea.136 The cost of the
contain 9 million metric tans of radioactive material. hLd
126. See generally notes 160-90 and accompanying text (describing the environmental damage to the area).
127. See ESFONIAN COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 22.
128. See/ iat 24-5.
129. See Borger, supra note 1 (relating that it could take up to twenty years to clean up the water and remove
the waste from the former naval base in Paldiski).
130. See Tom Hundley, Russia's Departure Leaves Estonia With A Cleanup Tab of $4 Billion, THE SALT
LAKETRM., Dec. 2,1994, available in 1994 WL 10029327 (quoting a Western diplomat in Estonia).
131. Id. (summarizing the missile silos large enough to accommodate two tractor-trailers stand empty, bent
and broken radar towers stand like oversized scarecrows, barracks, stripped and burned by vandals, as well as
environmental pollution from fifty years of mishandling toxic, poisonous, and nuclear materials).
132. 11.
133. d Dilapidated storage tanks left on the base in Paldiski were left to leak thousands ofgallons ofheating
oil into the ground. Id; see also Borger, supra note I (stating that the Russians left Estonia with a terrifying mess
to clean up).
134. See Hundley, supra note 130; see also Borger, supra note I (reiterating that the radioactive waste, oil
and chemicals surrounding Paldiski have also contributed to the desecration of the drinking water).
135. See Hundley, supra 130. The absorption of heavy fuel oil and other fuels into the ground and ground
water is one of the primary sources of environmental pollution. Ud. In an area of approximately sixteen square
kilometers at Tapa airport and its surrounding area has been contaminated by dumped fuel to a depth of two to eight
meters. Id. Much of the fuel was dumped by pilots in order to falsify flight records. Id. At Amari airport the soil
and ground water over 20 hectares has been heavily contaminated to a depth of up to four meters. Id
136. See Environmental Damage from the Soviet-Russian Military Occupation, supra note 63. Radioactive
waste storage areas at the Sillamie uranium enrichment plant and the Paldiski nuclear reactors are the main
environmental concerns. Id. The slurry ponds at Sillamie are located on the shore of the Baltic Sea. Id
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Soviet-Russian occupation will be borne by Estonia for many years to come. 37 In
a 1994 Report from the Estonia's Ministry of Environment the estimated"' cost of
cleaning up the mess left by the Russian troops was at $54,752,697,000 Estonian
Kroons.'39 In 1996, the Deputy Director in charge of cleaning up and disposing of
the nuclear waste on the base of Paldiski, stated that the clean up project on the base
alone would cost over US$125 million dollars."4 The total cost to clean up
Estonia's environment is an intangible figure that can never be determined.
The cost of cleaning up the environment after the Soviet troops departed from
the military bases has increased with every estimate."" Proving that the decade long
concerns and fears over the environmental degradation caused by the carelessness
and years of neglect during Soviet occupation were a reality.42 Although the
numbers are hard to determine, the estimates have stated that approximately
132,000 Soviet troops' 43 were based in Estonia-a country of only 1.5 million
people.'" The Soviet military was located on approximately 570 military
137. See Borger, supra note I (discussing areas of the environment are so badly contaminated that they may
never return to their natural state).
138. Since 1992 yearly reports have attempted to estimate the cost to clean up the environment. With each
year the estimates of the cost to clean up the damage increases. See ESTONIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 29-
30. Estonia distributed a preliminary report in 1992 to the United Nations Conference on the Environment and
Development (UNED) detailing that the cost of cleaning up the site of a former uranium enrichment plant in
Sillamdie, plus the removal of the nuclear reactors left by the Soviet military in Paldiski was going to cost at least
3.5 billion ERK. Id.; see also Environmental Damage from the Soviet.Russian Military Occupation. Estonia, supra
note 63. In 1993, the Estonian Ministry of Environment issued a precursory report summing up the preliminary
findings of degradation the environment had suffered under Russian control; concluding the cost of damage to the
environment was well over 10 billion EKR. Id.; see also Otsa, supra note 45 (giving another preliminary estimating
in the latter part of 1993 detailing the damage to the environment caused by the Soviet military as 15.3 billion
kroons).
139. See Environmental Damage from the Soviet-Russian Military Occupation, supra note 63 (interpreting
that $54,752,697,000 kroons is over 4 billion US dollars). After the Estonian and Russian President signed the
Troop Withdrawal Agreement for the withdrawal of the remaining troops from Estonia, the Ministry created a
"Working Group" to produce another preliminary report assessing the extent of environmental damage. IS The
"Working Group" estimated in 1994, that the cost of repairing the damage to the Estonian environment at over $54
billion EKR or roughly 4 billion US dollars. Id.; see also Felix Corley, Estonia: Facing up to Independence, JANE'S
INTELLIGENCE REV., Mar. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 9483554.; but see Michael Tarm, U.S. Outlines Plans
for Helping to Clean Up Nuclear Sub Base, Assoc. PRESS, MARCH 13, 1995, available in 1995 WL 4368830
(mentioning that the clean up of the nuclear waste in Paldiski could cost as much as four billion dollars).
140. See Ariane Sains, Estonia Faces Cleanups From USSR Subs, U Processing, With No Funds,
NUCLEONICS WEEK, Aug. 29,1996, available in 1996 WL 11465671 (citing Henno Putik, the deputy director of
AS Alara who is in charge of cleaning up the base).
141. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (detailing the cost of cleaning up the environment).
142. See Treaty Between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation on the Withdrawal of Russian
Federation Armed Forces from the Territory of the Republic of Estonia and on the Conditions of Their Temporary
Presence, Unofficial Translation, July 26, 1994, Est.-Russ., art. 22, (visited Feb. 21, 1999)
<http'/www.vm.ee/eng/govmin/trpwithd.html> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Troop
Withdrawal Agreement]. Final Withdrawal of the Troops, took place on August 31, 1994, pursuant to the Troop
Withdrawal Agreement between Russian and Estonia. Id
143. See Environmental Damage from the Soviet.Russian Military Occupation, supra note 63 (stating
132,000 Soviet-Russian Troops equals one third of the number based in Easter Germany after WWII).
144. See id.
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installations of various types and sizes, which covered a total of two percent of
Estonian territory. 45 The troops on the bases served a myriad of functions ranging
from strategic nuclear bombers to mechanized infantry assault units, to frontier
guards who ensured that the local population did not escape.' 46 Environmental and
ecological damage had been effected on all territory under the jurisdiction of the
Soviet military forces. 47 One study showed that three-fourths of all the bases the
Soviet's occupied are environmental disasters."~ The repair and restoration of the
environment to its natural state, affected by the Soviet-Russian occupation will take
many decades.1 49 But this task is necessary to contribute to the quality of life not
just in Estonia, but to the Baltic Sea region.
I. Two CITuS DESTROYED BY RUSSIAN OCCUPATION-AN
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER
Today, Estonia suffers from massive environmental degradations as a
consequence of the Soviet construction of an industrial infrastructure which
annihilated Estonia's natural resources.!" ° All the exploitation of the environment
was done without commensurate planning to mitigate the environmental effects of
this development.151 A couple of examples of this massive degradation to the
environment can be found in the water surrounding Tapa Airport, the nuclear
facility in Paldiski, at the uranium facility in Sillamite and in the storage areas of
Orikiila, Udriku, Pahida, Keila-Joa and Randalu.15 2 The widespread pollution is one
of the long lasting hardships that the Soviet era left behind for the Estonian people
to clean up.'5 3 When the majority of the army left Estonia in 1990, they left
widespread destruction to discarded buildings and equipment.' 54 Along with the
145. See Environmental Clean up After 50 years of Soviet Russian Military Occupation will cost over Four
billion USD, supra note 59. The total area of this territory was 85,175 hectares, or approximately two percent of
the Republic of Estonia. Il; see also Corley, supra note 139.
146. See Corley, supra note 139.
147. See Environmental Damage from the Soviet-Russian Military Occupation, supra note 63.
148. See Environmental Clean Up After 50 Years of Soviet Russian Military Occupation Will Over Four
Billion USD, supra note 59 (presenting that 85 percent of the area under the control of the Soviet-Russian military
has either ground water or soil damage).
149. See Hibbs, supra note 11; see also Borger, supra note 1 (estimating that it will take 20 years to clean
up the area surrounding Paldiski).
150. See Estonian History in Brief(1940-1991), supra note 52.
151. See id
152. See Environmental Damage from the Soviet-Russian Military Occupation, supra note 63 (detailing that
poisonous residue fuel and oxidisers have remained in tanks or poured into the ground).
153. SeeEsToNIACouNTRYSrDYsupranote6, at29 (relating the widespread pollution came from military
installations covering more than 80,000 hectares of Estonian territory). Examples of polluted substance dumped
on Estonian land include hundreds of thousands of get few into the ground, improperly disposed toxic chemicals,
and discarded outdated explosives and weapons in coastal and inland waters. Iii
154. See Isobel Montgomery, Europe: Russia's Toxic Retreat Tread Carefully in Estonia You Never Know
What the Kremlin Has Left Behind, GUARDAN EURO PAGE, Friday, April 8,1994, available in 1994 WL 9705596
(stating that the Russian Armed Forces left Estonia with bitterness and spite upon departure smashing windows,
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structural damage, Soviet troops left behind significant environmental pollution as
well the bill for clean up costs.155 As evidenced, enormous amounts of
environmental pollution was left behind in nearly all the territories taken over from
the Soviet military units.1m The most hazardous military objects are the airfields
containing the fuel tanks and the nuclear waste. 57 At the Tapa and Amari air bases,
the land is contaminated with fuel oil and kerosene to a depth of 20 feet.15 The two
cities which, involved and to this day have the most damage to the environment and
are considered a threat to mankind are Paldiski and Sillam.ie. 59
A. Paldiski Naval Facility
The half-century of Soviet military presence"t in Paldiski, inflicted
environmental damage16t that will take years and cost billions of dollars to clean
up.-' 62 The former Russian naval facility is situated on the base of the Pakri
Peninsula. 63 The facility is 4 km'" from the small town of Paldiski and 46 km
165
ripping out electrical wiring and carting away everything moveable from the hundreds of military installations
located across Estonia).
155. See Slants & Trends, REPORT ON DEFEN SE PLANT WASTES, August 19, 1994, available in 1994 WL
2508085 (noting areas of arable land so contaminated with land mines, unexploded bombs, shrapnel and other
hazards that they are closed to citizens).
156. See generally Environmental Damage From the Soviet-Russian Military Occupation, supra note 63
(noting the pollution is from oil products, chemicals, ruins, and domestic and toxic wastes).
157. See Otsa, supra note 45 (explaining that fuel from the territory of Tapa military airfield has immersed
in the soil and polluted most of the surface under the town). Id. Groundwater is undrinkable on an area of 16 square
kilometers. Id. At the fuel tank of the military airfield of Sillaotsa, Tartu there have been major environmental
accidents (in 1968, 1971, 1981, twice in 1988, 1990, 1991) when thousands of tons of fuel leaked out of the tank.
Id. The upper surface layer in the region is saturated with oil products on a territory of 20 hectares. Id
158. See Henley, supra note 6; Environmental Damage from the Soviet-Russian Military Occupation, supra
note 63; Otsa, supra note 45 (citing statistics supporting the fact that Tapa military airfield's soil is saturated with
fuel).
159. See Environmental Damage from the Soviet-Russian Military Occupation, supra note 63.
160. See Trei, supra note 110 (documenting that Estonians marked the pullout ofan estimated 150,000 troops
by ringing church bells and lighting candles). Officials canceled plans for celebrations, mindful that the country's
problems won't disappear along with the Russian military. I,
161. See Estonia Doesn't Expect Russia to Payfor Environmental Damage, supra note 68 (detailing the cost
of cleaning up Paldiski's nuclear waste from the reactor and the water and soil surrounding the base, which have
been polluted with oil and heavy metals); see generally Montgomery, supra note 154 (discussing that the forest and
coastline on the Baltic Sea have been destroyed, and land and water supplies have been contaminated all over the
country).
162. See Environmental Damage from the Soviet-Russian Military Occupation, supra note 63 (indicating in
a recent Environment Ministry report, the Soviet Army caused 54.7 billion kroons ($4A3 billion) of damage to
84,000 hectares of Estonian land); Trei, supra note 110.
163. See Russian Forces Toll in Estonia Runs Into 5 BLN Dollars, BALTIC NEWS SERV., Nov. 25 1998,
available in 1998 WL 20198293.
164. See BLACK'SLAwDICTIONARY534 (3ded. 1971).Onekilometeris 1,000 meters and.62 ofamile. Four
km is just under 2.5 miles.
165. Id 46 km is roughly 32-5 miles.
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west of Tallinn, the capital of Estonia.t66 Prior to the Soviet occupation, the city of
Paldiski was a pre-war tourist resort.167 During the occupation by the USSR,
Paldiski was the secret location"es used for training crews on nuclear powered
submarines. 169 The town was closed to Estonian citizens until 1994, home only to
Soviet soldiers and their families during occupation. 70 Today, Paldiski resembles
a ghost town"7 containing approximately 4,000 inhabitants whom are mostly
unemployed retired Soviet military personnel.fl
2
In 1994 after Soviet troops departed from Estonia, the Paldiski naval facility
was opened to Estonians for the first time in fifty years. Left behind on the base
were two nuclear reactors.1 73 As a separate part of the Troop Withdrawal
Agreement, 7 ' two hundred Soviet specialists were brought in to dismantle the two
training nuclear reactors and clean up the surrounding environment 5 Tension
166. See Leonid Levitsky, Military Base in Paldiski Has Ceased to Exist, RUSS. PRESS DIG., July 23, 1994,
available in 1994 WL 9144485.
167. See Trei, supra note 110; see also Russian Forces Toll in Estonia Runs Into 5 BLN Dollars, supra note
163 (describing Pakri's Peninsula as unique nature with steep bluffs and beautiful sandy beaches).
168. See Montgomery, supra note 154 (explaining that there is no indication to tell you that you are entering
a forbidden zone, because the entrance to Paldiski is unmarked and there are no road signs). This is a place "so
secret that during the Soviet occupation it was left off the map." IL Paldiski was one of the Russian military's last
secret testing grounds for nuclear weapons before Estonia declared its independence. i; see also Levitsky, supra
note 166.
169. Levitsky, supra note 166. (explaining that Paldiski is just one of 570 former Soviet bases in Estonia);
see also, The Paldiski Nuclear Facilities: A Status Report, ESMNIA REV., 1995, (visited Jan. 18,1999)
<http'l/www.vm.ee/englestoday/1995/9509pal.html> (copy on file with The Tansnational Lawyer) (relating until
1993, the town of Paldiski, was a closed town with restricted access available only to the Russian Navy); Finland's
1140 Wins Paldiski Clean-up Project, WATER BRIEFING, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, available in 1995
WL 8684576 (stating the two nuclear submarine reactors at Paldiski were used as part of the training of Soviet navy
marines, until Estonia declared its independence in 1991).
170. See Henley, supra note 6. During occupation Paldiski was populated with 11,000 Soviets since the town
was closed to Estonian citizens for security reasons. ld.
171. See Trei, supra note 110 (declaring after the Russian forces departed, all that was left in Paldiski was
a decaying town of crumbling apartments and pot-holed streets).
172. See Andrew Mueller, Altered States, SUNDAYTIMES-LONDON, Features, March 15, 1998, available in
1998 WL 8044734 (describing that today Paldiski is a ghost town of 4,000 locals who are largely unemployed).
The town now called a village consists only of the rubble jerry-built tenement blocks. l "Children and dogs play
in the deserted buildings awaiting demolition; men stand around in silent, shiftless groups on comers, as if engaged
in beard-growing contests. Padiski is an above-ground cemetery." Ad; see also Henley, supra note 6 (detailing the
town's dilapidated state of disrepair). The windows on most of the town's building are boarded up, roofless, and
contain leaking fuel pipes. L
173. See Henley, supra note 6 (relating that the Estonians are most worried about the two nuclear reactors
the Russian's left behind, one of them from the 1960s).
174. See Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Estonia and the Government of the Russian
Federation on Procedures and Deadlines for the Decommissioning of the Nuclear Reactors and the Guarantee of
Nuclear and Radiation Safety on the Pakri Peninsula of the Republic of Estonia, July 30,1994, Est.-Russ., (visited
Feb. 21, 1999) <http.//www.vm.ee/englgovmin/paldiskd.html> [hereinafter Agreement for Decommissioning of the
Nuclear Reactors] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
175. See Yuri Maloverian, Dismantling of Russian Nuclear Reactors at Paldiski is Underway, RUSS. PRESS
DIG., Aug. 24, 1994, available in 1994 WL 9141839 (stating that the job was completed by two hundred Russian
Military experts who extracted the spent nuclear rods encasing them in concrete and then sent to Russia); see also
Eastern, Central Europe: Baltics Optimistic Soviet Damage to Environment Can Be Reversed, supra note 56,
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surrounded the dismantling process because this was a unique situation with one
country dismantling the reactors in another territory.176 The dismantling of the
Paldiski nuclear reactors was finished by September 30, 1995.1
7
Estonia began the process of cleaning up the radioactive waste, oil, and material
contaminating the environment surrounding the facility that remained after the
Soviets withdrew upon completion of the dismantling of the reactors. The Soviet
military left behind numerous sources of dangerous pollutants. For example, 4,100
hectares178 of oil-polluted soil, 158,000 tons of waste steel, iron and heavy metals,
5,080 tons of waste oil, more than 170 tons of used batteries, 2,080 tons of waste
chemicals and 2,900 tons of plastic and rubber waste were found surrounding the
Paldiski naval base.179 In December of 1998, Rein Ratas, the state secretary of the
Ministry of Environment, stated the environmental damage caused by the Soviet
military had been estimated at roughly four times the size of Estonia's national
budget tso
The cost of decommissioning the two nuclear reactors was estimated to cost
Estonia ten million dollars.181 Russia was estimated to spend seventeen billion
rubies (US$3.4 million) on dismantling the nuclear reactors and cleaning up
environmental damage."s Estonia received five million dollars from abroad
including two million dollars from the United States, Sweden pledged three million
kronor (US$428,000), and Finland two million markkaa (US$400,000).1 3 In 1995,
after the Soviets departed, a Finnish state energy group, signed an agreement with
the Estonian government to decontaminate the radioactive wastewater on
(relating the time it would take to decommission the reactors and the cost to clean up the surrounding land); Henley,
supra note 6.
176. See Henley, supra note 6 (stating tension surrounded the decommission of the two reactors, not because
of skill or willingness on the part of Estonia or Russia, but on their skepticism of working together).
177. Agreement to Dismantle Russian Nuclear Reactors in Paldiski Signed, ESTONIA REV., July 30, 1994,
volume 4, Number 30.2. July 28-31 (Jan. 18, 1999) <http.//www.vm.ee/engtreview/ 1994/94er2831/07e.html>.
"This is a unique agreement in international law, since it provides for the dismantling of a reactor on another
country's territory," said Estonian Foreign Ministry Depute Under-Secretary Raul Mllk.Id.
178. See WEaSTE'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 534 (7th ed. 1971). One hectare equals 2.47
acres. Thus, 4,100 hectares equals 10,127 acres.
179. See Russian Forces Toll in Estonia Runs Into 5 BLJV Dollars, supra note 163. The list does not end,
Russian forces also polluted Pakri's soil and subsoil water with crude oil and heavy metals. A spokesperson for the
Environment of Ministry stated that today there is still high levels of calcium, ionic sulphate and iron in the water.
Id.
180. See Estonia Doesn't Expect Russia To Pay For Environmental Damage, supra note 68.
181. See Levitsky, supra note 166; see also Eastern Central Europe: Dec. 21, 1994, supra note 56. The
Estonian government estimates at least $4 billion in remediation will be needed in Estonia. d Remediation will
include work for removal of underground storage tanks and unexploded weapons to treatment of contaminated
groundwater and mixed waste. Id
182. See Estonia: Government Begins Clean-Up of Russian Nuclear Legacy, INTER PRESS SERV., May 18,
1995, available in 1995 WL 2261181.
183. Id The total cost of decommissioning and clean-up is expected to cost US$25 million. 1d; see also IVO
Discharges First TreatedEffluent From Soviet Naval Base, WATER BmEING, Apr. 19,1995, available in 1995 WL
8684650.
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Paldiski.1" The project was funded by the Estonian and Finnish governments!1"
Arvo Niltenberg, the head of the state-owned company responsible for clearing up
the rest of the site estimated that the operation could cost up to 48 million pounds.'"
Reaffirming this view, Teofil Grochowski the project leader from the U.S., stated
that the total cost of the operation could run up to between US$60 and US$80
million dollars."s
The treatment for cleaning the radioactive water was under speculation for
breaching the law and causing environmental harm in the Baltic Sea.'" After the
radioactive waste water is treated by IVO, it is released into the Baltic Sea." 9 This
process brings up the issues of which international norms apply to the treatment of
radioactive water when it is being released into the Baltic Sea, creating the potential
to causing transboundary harm." This problem also raises the issue of whether
Russia could be held liable since their military forces polluted the Paldisld naval
base while occupying Estonia. Whether Russia is liable or not under general
principles of international environment law is discussed in Section V of this
Comment.
B. Sillamrie's Radioactive Waste Facility
In the city of Sillamde, which is located in northeast Estonia on the Baltic Sea,
is another former Soviet Military plant.19' Sillamiie was a formerly closed town on
the northern coast that refined uranium for the Soviet military to be shipped to
Paldiski for consumption."9 The Sillamde facility was originally opened in the late
1940's, when it was used to extract uranium from local ore. 93 For several decades
184. See Finland's IVO Wins Paldiski Clean-up Project, supra note 169 (explaining the process of how to
clean up and filter radioactive liquids to render them non-hazardous). The company decontaminated 120,000 liters
of radioactive water the first two months, and finished within six months with the rest of the 730 cubic meters of
contaminated radioactive water. lId
185. See U (conveying that the Estonian government provided 80% of funds for the first clean up, but that
they had no guarantees that additional funding will be available to pay for the treatment of the radioactive waste
water).
186. See Henley, supra note 6.
187. See IVO Discharges First Treatment Effluent From Soviet Naval Base, supra note 183.
188. Seeld (stating the method ofhow the radioactive wastewater is discharged). After the radioactive water
is treated and processed it is being released into the Baltic Sea. Id
189. See id.; see also Finland's IVO Wins Paldiski Clean-up Project, supra note 169. The process IVO uses
claims it is capable of filtering radioactive liquids to render them non Hazardous. Id
190. See Finland's IVO Wins Paldiski Clean-up Project, supra note 169. IVO also states that there is
absolutely no danger to the environment, and fit for human consumption. Id.
191. See Estonian Minister Meets Deputy Secretary of State, New US Ambassador in Washington, BALTC
NEWs SERV., Oct. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 20195243. A closed-town, is anotherword foroff limits except
by those who have a permit to reside there. Id
192. See Trei, supra note 110.
193. See Environment Body Puts Sillamlie Radioactive Deposit on 'Hot Spot' List', supra note 79. The
deposit was set up in 1959, but began laying radioactive waste from the plant's production cycle in the area as soon
as 1948. lId; see also Julian Isherwood, International: Uranium Fearfor Baltic, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH- LONDON,
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the town was declared an off-limits area for residents and to the rest of the country,
accessible only to the workers and Soviet military. '
Today, the Sillami e waste dump holds a large green lake filled with radioactive
waste just sitting 10 yards from the Baltic Sea. 95 It is about 33 hectares (81.5
acres)' in area and 25 meters (82 feet) g9 high. 98 A preliminary report' 99 estimates
that the pool contains approximately eight million cubic meters of liquid radioactive
waste spreading two miles wide.m Included within the lake is 1,200 tons of
uranium.20
1
The deposit of radioactive waste lying just outside the former Soviet military
industry plant in Sillamde is one of the most environmentally dangerous sites 2 in
Europe.203 One of the main risk factors at the Sillamqe plant is the underwater
Sept. 3, 1992, available in 1992 WL 9058164 (reporting the Soviets set up the plant in Sillamde soon after World
War 11 to extract rare earth metals from ore brought in from Russia. ld; see also Russian Radioactive Waste
Threatens Estonia, ENVTI. WATCH E. EuR., Oct. 1, 1992, available in 1992 WL 2657372.
194. See Environment Body Puts Sillamile Radioactive Deposit on 'Hot Spot' List, supra notes 79.
195. See US Nuclear Experts ConcernedAbout Sillamle Dump, BALTICNEWS SERV., Oct. 2,1998 available
in 1998 WL 20194808 (observing that the industrial waste dump lies just a few dozen meters from the Gulf of
Finland); see also Departing Russians Leave Environmental Headaches in Baltics, supra note 6.
196. See WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW CoLLEGiATE, supra note 178, at 534. The lake contains 200,000 cubic
meters of wastewater covering 33 hectares, which is roughly 81.5 acres.
197. See id. One meter is 39.37 inches, or roughly 3 and 1/3 feet.
198. See US Nuclear Experts Concerned About Sillamdle Dump, supra note 195 (explaining in PHARE's
expert opinion, the Sillamlle waste dump is one of the worst environmental hazards in Europe).
199. See Trei, supra note 110 (stating that unverified reports have suggested that some of the containers
holding 3,000 tons of radioactive waste are leaking into the Baltic Sea).
200. Conference on Sillamile Radioactive Waste Dump to be Held in Tallinn, BALTIC NEWS SERV., Sept. 24,
1998, available in 1998 WL 20194287; see also Sains, supra note 140 (explaining that of the eight million cubic
meters of liquid radioactive waste, 6.3 million tons is of U processing residue and 150,000 cubic meters of uranium
mill tailings); see also generally Uranium Waste May Have Caused Estonian Health Problems, supra note 122 and
accompanying text (explaining the level of environmental damage surrounding the Sillamde facility).
201. See Securing of Radioactive Waste Deposit At Estonia's Sillamle To Cost 200 MLN Kroons, BALTIC
NEWS SERV., December 11, 1998, available in 1998 WL 23387328.
202. See Judith Perera, International Estonia Plans for Cleanup of Sillamile Radioactive Waste Site,
NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, Vol. 17, No. 48, December 11. 1997, available in 1997 WL 13045239 (examining the
March 1989 report that children at a nearby Sillame kindergarten were ill and reporting hair loss). Experts were
sent in to investigate when more than 20 children at the kindergarten began losing their hair. Id As a result of this
incident the school was closed and local residents moved from the area. Id; see also Mark J. Porubcansky, The
Soviet Union's Pollution Bill Comes Due: Water, Air Fouled, Even Mothers' Milk, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
July 2,1989, available in 1989 WL 2974517 (criticizing the fact that by July of 1989, the cause was still unknown,
but the ailment was apparently caused by the dirty environment). Furthermore by July, more than 90 children had
lost their hair since this mystery illness had first appeared. Id(Population at this time was 20,000 people); see also
Isherwood, supra note 193 (reporting by 1992, over 200 people, including an entire high school class had gone
bald). For a report of a similar occurrence, see Estonian Kids' Hair Loss Probed, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Mar. 12, 1989, available in 1989 WL 2974517 (explaining this same mystery disease, struck children in the
Ukrainian town of Chemovtsy in 1988). Doctors in Chemovtsy blamed acid rain containing thallium and othertoxic
agents for the outbreak. Id There more than 120 children in the town began to lose their hair and suffer irritation
and fever. Id Hair began to grow back on children from Chemovtsky after six weeks to two months. Id
203. See Sillamdle Waste Deposit One of the Most Dangerous in Europe, BALTIC NEWS SERV., July 9,1998,
available in 1998 WL 13516213. [A] spokesman at the Environmental Ministry in Tllinn reported that, "a recent
survey in Europe which covered over 800 deposits, mines and other facilities in eastern Europe, showed the
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uranium waste lake2° located immediately on the seashore and the danger that the
dam setting it off from the sea might give way.2 The radiation inside the lake is
five hundred times above accepted limits with no safety measures to control the
possibility of leaks into the soil surrounding the lake or the Baltic Sea.206 A thick
layer of watertight clay is the only protection that lies between the uranium and the
surface of the shallow pool." Early calculations of the toxicity of the lake estimate
that the liquid and solid radioactive objects contain radiation equal to 0.2 percent
of that released by Chernobyl.2 A report by the Swedish Radiation Protection
Institute, who helped the Estonian government measure the risk, found roughly one
hundred to one thousand times more radium than normal in samples of local soil
taken from the lake's wall.' Two samples taken outside the wall, which has been
rebuilt many times over the years, measured two-thousand times more than
normal.2
10
The annual estimated cost of cleaning up and reducing the toxic hazards
tentatively has been estimated at nearly three million kroons (US$235,000). 211 In
December of 1997 Estonian officials stated, remediation of the Sillamle reservoir
of liquid radioactive waste will cost an estimated $212 million kroons (US$15
million).2 2 This figure was reiterated in December of 1998, when the Estonian
government stated it will need at least $200 million kroons to make the lake of
Sillamle waste deposit as fourth in terms of environmental hazards among uranium industry facilities in the former
communist bloc, behind potential sources of pollution in Romania and Hungary."
204. See Isherwood, supra note 193 (identifying that there is about 1,000 tons of radium, 500 tons of thorium
and a couple of million tons of calcium sulphate, calcium fluoride and ash). The uranium was deposited under 15
feet of water in an artificial lake and is more than 20 yards deep and 60 feet above sea level. Id.; see also Perera,
supra note 202.
205. See Isherwood, supra note 193 (explaining not only is the waste located very close to the Baltic Sea,
but the dam separating it from the sea is not very secure); see also Conference on Sillamde Radioactive Waste
Dump to be Held in Tallinn supra note 200;, see also Estonian Company To Map Elimination of Sillamae Waste
Dump. BALTIC NEWS SERV., July 13, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13516557.
206. See Buildup of Uranium Waste in Estonian Pond Threatens Gulf ofFinland, Baltic Sea, AM. METAL
MARKET, June 8, 1993, available in 1993 WL 3118384 (warning that the concentration of radioactive substances
in the sea along the narrow coastal strip had been detected). Over the years four million tons of uranium was
processed at the plant Id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See Elif Kaban, 'Hot' Iceberg Poses Nuclear Threat to Baltic, THE TORONTO STAR, May 29, 1993,
available in 1993 WL 7260110 (postulating that an overflow could send a stream of deadly waste into the Gulf of
Finland and the Baltic Sea, which is already the most polluted in Europe).
210. See id; see also Environment Body Puts Sillamre Radioactive Deposit on 'Hot Spots' List, supra note
79 (citing scientist from HELCOM who estimate that the waste deposit in Sillame accounts for half of the Baltic
Sea pollution coming from the Estonian territory).
211. See U.S. Nuclear Etperts ConcernedAbout Sillamnie Dump, supra note 195 (detailing that the work is
to be financed by the Firnish, Swedish, Danish, Norwegian and U.S. governments, the Nordic investment bank and
international organizations).
212. Perera, supra note 202 (reporting three sources will finance the remediation effort: the plant's present
owner, AS Silmet; the state budget; and international aid).
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radioactive waste environmentally safe.2 t3Scientists estimate that the waste deposit
accounts for half of the Baltic Sea pollution coming from the Estonian territory.214
Thus, until this facility is environmentally safe, it will continue polluting the Baltic
Sea possibly leading to responsibility for the transboundary harm caused to the
neighboring states.
IV. GENERAL PRNCImLES OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM
General principles of international law are derived from developed international
and municipal legal systems s The elements which are common within the major
legal systems throughout the world, evolve into general principles of international
law2 6 Recognizing the applicability of general principles to international law is
article 38(l)(c) of the ICJ.217 Most commonly, general principles are inserted into
undeveloped areas of international law to avoid undermining a judgment from an
insufficiency in the law. 18 Therefore, general principles derive authority in
international law when they are employed in decisions by international tribunals
and courts.219 Despite recognition that general principles of international law exist,
no definite definition of the scope or extent to which general principles apply has
been universally accepted.m
General principles of international law are also known as the rules of customary
international law.? International customary law generally consists of norms
213. See Securing ofRadioactive Waste DepositAt Estonia's Sillamde To Cost 200MLNKroons, supra note
201 (observing that the biggest mistake made by the military was not securing the ground under the deposit before
dumping waste in an area of 33 hectares by the Gulf of Finland).
214. See Envimnment Body Puts Silamle Radioactive Deposit on "Hot Spot" List, supra note 79.
215. See WALLACE, supra note 12, at 22. It is not clear whether general principles refer to those of the
international legal system or those of municipal legal systems. Ud This ambivalence is desirable as it imposes no
restriction on the principles which may be implied. I
216. See Statute of the ICJ, Art. 38(IXc), 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), supra note 10 (verifying general principles
of law as those recognized by civilized nations.); see also WALLACE, supra note 12, at 7,8, 20-22 (discussing
Article 38(lXc)).
217. See Statute of the ICJ, Art. 38(IXc), 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), supra note 10.
218. See WALLACE, supra note 12, at 21-22 (explaining international law as a legal system would be
inefficient if application of general principles of law were not "plugged in" to fill the gaps where the International
Court of Justice would be unable to give a decision based on law); see also BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 21-
24 (discussing general principles of international law).
219. See WAL.ACE, supra note 12, at 8 (stating Article 38 is regarded as an authoritative statement on the
sources of international law).
220. See id. at 23.
221. See Johathan I. Charney, International Agreement and the Development of Customary International
Law, WASH. L. REV. 971 (1986) (explaining customary international law); see also MCCAFFREY, supra note 35,
at 188-89. A customary norm is one that can be shown to be generally followed by the states concerned. Id.
Contrasting with an international principle, general principles of law are said to be recognized by civilized nations.
A civilized nation in this context applies to states with an organized legal system. See also, Statute of the ICJ, Art.
38(lXc), 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), which is briefly explained in, BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 15 (discussing
Article 38(lXc), which instructs the Court to apply "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
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derived from the actual practice of states undertaken in the belief that such practices
are required by international law.m2 Customary law may lay the groundwork for
persuasive evidence of the existence of a norm for the determination by a senior
court.m By laying the ground work, the court can determine the existence (or not)
of some alleged customary norm.2 The determination of whether the normative
nature of a practice is necessary in international law, must be based on a belief by
the state organs concerned that recognition of the norm is required.? Therefore,
determination of whether a customary norm is recognized in international law is
determined by looking at the practices of both states concerned and whether such
a norm is practiced by both states.2
International lawm traditionally involves law governing relationships between
sovereign states.' This idea of sovereignty has developed a territorial basis
recognized in the principles of international environmental law.2 This territory
as law."); see also WAU.ACE, supra note 12, at 8-18. Customary law is not to be confused with general principles
of international law. Id. Customary law is similar to general principles but customary law is a practice followed by
those concerned because they feel legally obliged to behave in such a way; where general principles are those such
as justice and equity. IM at 22.
222. See MCCAFFR, supra note 35, at 173-74 (describing that to identify norms it is necessary to study how
states actually behave). Customary international law is perceived to exist when a practice is exercised by states, over
an extended period of time, by a state with the conception that the action it takes is valid under international law,
and with the acquiescence of other states. Id.; see also ALExAND E Kiss & DmNAH SHELTON, INTERNAnONAL
ENvmoNmENTAL LAW 144 (1991) (interpreting customary international law requires establishing two elements:
(1) a general practice nations; and (2) the acceptance of the practice as binding international law).
223. Once a customarylaw comes into being, it is normally binding on all states concerned. See MCCAFPREY,
supra note 35, at 173-74 (qualifying though that a customary law will not become binding if a state from the
beginning objects to the norm, exempting itself from being bound by it); see also Libya v. Malta Continental Shelf
Case, 1985 ICY Rep 13, at 29-30. In this case decided by the ICJ, it stated that the material of customary
international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinlojuris of the states. Id. Thus, before
a custom is to become law both conduct and conviction on the part of the state are required. Id.
224. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 35, at 173-74 (explaining similar effects may be determined by legal
scholars; e.g. members of the International Law Commission or members elected to the UN General Assembly, of
the existence of a norm).
225. See id at 174 (clarifying that norms may not be based on merely a normal courtesy, a clearly
advantageous act, a means of seeking favor, creating good will, or of escaping a threat). This norm is also called
opln'ojuris; defined below. Id at 150. Most customary international law is generally created by involuntary and
inchoate processes that persuade states that they should behave in a particular way, but occasionally devices are
used to induce states to consider that acting in a particular way is legally required. Ide; see also BIRNM & BOYLE,
supra note 16, at 15. Opinio juris sive necessitatis, shortened to opiniojuris is "the conviction that conduct is
motivated by a sense of legal obligation, not merely of comity provides the evidence necessary to establish a
customary rule." Id
226. See BmNiE&BOYLE, supra note 16, at 15 (supporting the determination of how customary international
law becomes binding).
227. See generally note 18 and accompanying text (codifying the many and constantly changing definition
of international law).
228. See WAL.LA C, supra note 12, at 12 (defining international law as something of a misnomer); IAN
BROWNum, PRiNCILES OF PUBLC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990); M. N. SHAw, INTERNATiONAL LAW (1991).
229. See Declaration on the Right o Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53,
at 186-187, U.N. Doc. A141/53 (Dec. 4, 1986) (commenting on the concept of a state's sovereignty over its natural
resources is rooted in the old principle of territorial sovereignty). But the United Nations General Assembly has
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basis in international environmental law has developed between two apparently
contradicting principles.m First, states have sovereign rights over their own natural
resources."1  Second, states should not cause damage to the environment. 2
Furthermore, these two principles have been accepted by tribunals as a reflection
of international customs 233 and affirmed in international agreements in regards to
international environmental law.
A. General Principles of International Law: The Basis of State Responsibility
States both in law and practice, are in fact publicly responsible for their actions.
Responsibility to states for any action creating environmental damage that harms
another state, or the interests of the international community as a whole, is guided
by principles and norms of the international legal order.235 Responsibility is invoked
when a state violates an international obligation. This responsibility recognizes that
all rights of an international character involve international responsibility.2
General principles of international environmental law can be broken down into
two categories. Primary rules, which relate to the substantive obligations of States,
and secondary rules which apply as a consequence of breaching an obligation.
237
One such example of an important general principle, is the primary obligation of a
state to its territory, to carry out activities thereon as it wishes, but only to the extent
that no harm is caused thereby to other states.238 The primary obligation establishes
further encouraged that the right of nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources must be exercised
in the interest of their national development. Id.
230. See generally Max Valverde Soto, Note& Comment, General Principles ofInternational Environmental
Law, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 193 (1996) (discussing sovereignty and responsibility in international
environmental law).
231. See generally Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVnI),
U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962) (supporting the theory of a State's sovereign right over their
natural resources).
232. See id.; see also Declaration of the Right to Development, supra note 229, at 186-87 (reiterating that
states have the responsibility not to damage the environment).
233. See generally Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 389
(Mar. 24,1982) (accepting the soverign right of a state over its natural resources, plus the responsibility not to harm
the environment).
234. See Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, art. 12, 28 LL.M. 649, 668; see also United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural
Organization Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, art. 15, 11
LL.M 1358. 1363; see also United Nations Conference on Environmental Development: Convention on Biological
diversity, June 5, 1992, princ. 2, 31 I.L.M 818; see, eg., United Nations Conference on Environmental
Development- Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, art. 14, 31 I.L.M. 849, 867.
235. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 35, at 504-07,510.
236. See Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (Spain v. U.K.) 2 R.I.A.A. 615, 641 (1923).
237. For a discussion of the distinction between primary and secondary rules see Teresa A. Berwick,
Responiibility and Liabilityfor Environmental Damage: A Roadmap for International Environmental Regimes, 10
GEo. INT'L ENvT. L REv. 257, 259-260 (1998); see also McCAFFREY, supra note 35, at 504-05.
238. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20; see also Rio Declaration, supra note 48 (explaining the
principle of refraining from causing transboundary harm).
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a general principle of responsibility upon one state to not conduct activities upon
its state that cause transboundary harm to another. By breaching this primary
obligation, the state incurs liability.
State responsibility in international law refers to liability-that of one state to
another for the non-observance of the obligations imposed by the international legal
systems. 2 9 An example of state responsibility arises when conditions in one state
lead to the infliction of harm on other states.u Therefore, by breaching an
international obligation the state subjects itself to responsibility.2" This is also
referred to as a "primary rule" 2" of international law.2" When a breach occurs, the
primary rule entails the breaching country to take responsibility for the legal
consequences of the breach of an international obligation.2' Secondary rules relate
to the legal consequences of the failure to comply with international environmental
law.245 Examples of secondary rules are the taking of responsibility by repairing the
harm (restitution)246 or, where this is not possible, to provide monetary
compensation (indemnity)2 7 to the injured country.2" Both obligations contribute
239. See WALLACE, supra note 12, at 166 (discussing as an absolute principle all states are equally
responsible under international law for their illegal acts); see generally State Responsibility: Eighth report on State
Responsibility, Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 3 (1979) (summarizing the ILC's thirty-five articles indicating when
responsibility may be incurred, which has been adopted by the Commission).
240. See BROWNUE, supra note 228, at 397 (stating that a state may not use its territory in a manner that
causes harm to another state).
241. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 509-11 (explaining that primary rules relate to environmental
obligations under international law); see also Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Final Report Prepared for the Eighth
Committee of the Institute of International Law by the Rapporteur on the Subject of Environmental Responsibility
and Liability, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVL. L REV. 279, at 279,281-2 (1998) [hereinafter Vicuna Report-1998].
242. See Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 510-11 (noting the differences between primary and
secondary rules).
243. Id. (explaining the obligation not to cause transboundary pollution harm to another country, is an
example of a primary rule).
244. See Part I of the draft articles on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission on
first reading in 1980, entitled, The Origin of International Responsibility, Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 30, 30 (1981).
Once a breach has occurred secondary rules deal with the legal obligation. Id. Secondary rules also concern whether
an international wrongful act has been committed in the first place. Id.; see also Vicuna Report-1998, supra note
241, at 281-2; see also Willem Riphagen, Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on the Content, Forms and
Degrees ofInternational Responsibility (Part 2 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility), Y.B. INT'LL COMM'N
107 (1982) (describing that secondary rules specify the content, forms and degrees of international responsibility).
245. See BROWN WEISS ErAL, supra note 155, at 505.
246. See Chorzow Factory Case, P.C.IJ. (Ser. A) No. 17, at47 (1928). The purpose of restitution is to "wipe
out all the consequences ofthe illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed
if that act had not been committed." Ma.
247. SeeEduardoJindnezde Archaga, InternationalResponsibility, inMANUALOFPUBUCINTERNATI7ONAL
LAW 531,567-68 (Max Sorensen ed. 1968) (defining indemnity from the Chorzow Factory case as the "payment
of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind should bear"). Indemnity is also generally referred
to as a form of reparation. lI
248. See E. Jimdnez de Ardchaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 Rec. Des Cours 9,
285 (1978-1). Reparation is the generic terms which describes the various methods available to a State for
discharging or releasing itself from [international] responsibility. Id The forms of reparation may consist in
restitution, indemnity or satisfaction. Id
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to the continuing development of environmental rules, even though States have
been rather reluctant to simultaneously agree on the pertinent rules of
responsibility. 9
B. State Responsibility to the Environment: Types of Liability for a Breach
One of the manners in which states may be held accountable in interstate claims
under international law for environmental harm, is the principle of state
responsibility,210 or as it is sometimes referred to as international liability. 5 When
a state breaches a principle of state responsibility, claims may be brought before
international tribunals, the ICJ, or alternatively settled by negotiation or diplomatic
means.' 2
The basis of responsibility usually lies in the breach of obligations undertaken
by states or imposed on them by international law. 3 In environmental cases,
responsibility most frequently arises either because of the breach of one or more of
the customary obligations recognized between states or because of a breach of a
treaty.' Generally, principles of international law governing the states and their
249. See generally Developments in the Law: International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1484
(1991) (criticizing in part that international liability remains an empty abstraction).
250. See E. Jiminez de Ardehaga, supra note 248, at 267-68 (establishing elements of international
responsibility). Arichaga sets forth three elements which are "essential" to the establishment of international
responsibility:
(i) The existence of an act or omission which violates an obligation established by a rule of
international law in force between the State responsible for the act or omission and the State
injured thereby.
(i) The unlawful act must be imputable to the State as a legal person.
(i) Loss or damage must have resulted from the unlawful act.
Id; see also J. Barboza International Liability, 247 REC. DES COURS 301, 305-06 (reiterating the meaning of
international responsibility); see generally Vicuna Report-1998, supra note 241, at 283-85 (discussing that State
responsibility refers to the consequences of a state's failure to exert sufficient regulatory control over activities
within its jurisdiction to meet its international obligations).
251. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 509-12. For a distinguishing discussion on the difference
between State responsibility and international liability; see also generally Vicuna Report-1998, supra note 241, at
283-86 (contrasting international liability and state responsibility). International liability reefers more generally to
mechanisms for compensating and otherwise remedying harm caused by states or other actors, whether or not the
harm resulted from the breach of an international obligation. Id
252. See BmNiE & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 139.
253. See IAN BROWNUEp, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, 37, 60-62 (1992); see also BRNW & BOYLE,
supra note 16, at 139; see also Statute of the ICJ, Art. 38(1)(c), 59 Stat. 1055 (1945) (stating that the ICJ lists
Article 38 as one of the sources of international law to be applied by the Court is "the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations); see MCCAFFREY, supra note 35, at 545 (suggesting in theory that if a norm is
generally recognized by states, it is also another way, in appropriate circumstances, to be drawn upon in regulating
their relations inter se).
254. See generally Julio Barboza, Sixth Report on International LiabilityforInjurious ConsequencesArisng
Out of Acts Not ProhibitedBy International Law, U.N. GAOR, 42nd Sess. U.N. Doe A/CN. 4/428 (Mar. 15,1990)
(detailing a state's responsibility not to cause transboundary harm); see also Report of the International Law
Commission: International LiabiliyforInjurious ConsequencesArising Out ofAct Not ProhibitedBy International
Law, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doec. A/45/10 (1990) (commenting on the responsibility of a state
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 12
responsibility also apply to the breach of obligations relating to environmental
protection."
A violation of international environmental law results when activities within a
state's jurisdiction or control cause damage to the environment of other states or
areas beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction.2-6 Under international
environmental law liability for a breach of this principle is recognized by several
different principles of responsibility for a wrongful act and a principle of state
responsibility attaching liability without a wrongful act.2 7
1. Fault Responsibili 8 (Negligence)
One principle of responsibility for a wrongful act is that of fault
responsibility.259 Under the traditional view, this principle is characterized by the
fact that the victim State has to prove, in addition to the breach of an international
obligation, the psychological fault (willful or negligent conduct) of the organ of the
State accused of the wrongful act.20 The plaintiff also has the burden to prove the
negligent behavior and the consequentially provoked damage.5 1 Another view
places emphasis on the content of a particular category of primary obligations of the
State. 2 This responsibility is based on due diligence.
for breaching the obligation to not cause transboundary harm).
255. See Vicuna Report-1998, supra note 241, at 283. Thus in general the breach of an international legal
obligation is an internationally wrongful act that gives rise to state responsibility. l
256. SeeStockholmDeclaration,supmnote20, atprinc. 21;seealso Rio Declaration,supra note48, atprinc.
2.
257. For a full discussion see Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 509-12. The distinction between state
liability and civil liability establish the main difference in types of liability. Id State liability refers to the liability
of international subjects, State or any other international organization, whereas civil liability refers to liability of
any legal or natural person. Id Both State and civil liability can be subdivided into fault based and strict liability.
Id
258. See E. Jimnez de Ar6chaga, supra note 248, at 269-71 (establishing the basis of fault responsibility).
259. See BIRNtE & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 141-42. Sometimes 'fault' in regards to the law of state
responsibility is confusing because the term can be used subjectively, requiring intent, recklessness, or negligence
on the part of the state or its agents, or it can be used objectively, meaning simply the breach of an international
obligation. Id.
260. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 509-12.
261. See generally Eduardo Jimdnez de Ar6chaga, supra note 247, at 534 (commenting on fault as an element
of international responsibility, where the plaintiff generally has the burden of proof, just like a general negligence
tort action).
262. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 509-12. (explaining under this view, one must speak of the
principle of responsibility for breach of due diligence obligations, therefore due diligence should be considered as
an objective and international standard of behavior). The conduct to be expected of a good government has been
defined with greater precision by means of the enactment of internationally agreed standards. Id; see also Vicuna
Report-1998, supra note 241, at 283 nn. 23 & 24 (citing to other sources which supports the generalization of fault-
based responsibility stated in terms of the due diligence test).
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2. Objective Responsibilie 3 (Strict Liability)
Objective responsibility, contrasts with fault responsibility.' Under the
traditional view, objective responsibility is characterized by the fact that
responsibility does not require fault, but arises from the mere breach of an
international obligation2" and is not normally a necessary condition of
responsibility.267 Also referred to as strict liability, this principle operates on the
basis of the objective face of harm, generally involving an obligation of result, but
also allows for appropriate exemptions and limitations.m In some cases this may
imply a reversal of the burden of proof, wherein the state's diligence or state of
mind remains relevant.26 In the alternative, strict liability may imply that a failure
of due diligence or subjective fault are not required because liability attaches
without requiring the proof of fault, unless there is a valid defense.270
3. Responsibility Without a Wrongful Act (Objective and Absolute)
International environmental law also applies another variation of strict or
absolute liability, which directly attaches to the defendant without regard to fault.271
263. See J. Barboza, supra note 250, at 307 (discussing the meaning of objective liability); see also E.
Jimdnez de Ar6chaga, supra note 248, at 271-73 (defining objective liability as absolute).
264. See Pisillo-Mazzeschisupra note 38, at511-12. (expressing that objective responsibility is also referred
to as responsibility without fault).
265. See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 142. Used in the subjective sense, 'fault' is almost never the
basis of responsibility in environmental disputes, although it is not inappropriate to use the term to describe the
reckless or intentional infliction of avoidable injury in situations such as the Russian Armed forces testing nuclear
missiles off the coast of Estonia, outside the Naval Base at Paldiski.
266. For a discussion on international obligations regarding objective responsibility, see Pisillo-Mazzeschi,
supra note 38, at 509-11.
267. See Eduardo Jimnez de Ar6chaga, supra note 247, at 534-37 (explaining that "the decisive
consideration is that unless the rule of international law which has been violated specifically envisages malice or
culpable negligence, the rules of international law do not contain a general floating requirement of malice or
culpable negligence as a condition of responsibility"). ld.
268. Vicuna Report-1998, supra note 241, at 286. Illustrative of this approach is the Convention of the
Council of Europe on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting for Activities Dangerous to the Environment, June 21,
1993, 32 LL.M. 1228 (1993); see also BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 16; see also IAN BROWNLE, SYSTEM OF TE
LAW OF NATIONS, STATE REsPONSIBILITY, Part I, at 44 (1983).
269. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 142 (noting that the reversal of the burden of proof usually requires
that the defendant state bear the responsibility of showing that it was negligent or otherwise at fault).
270. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 509-12; see also Vicuna Report-1998, supra note 241, at 286
(stating that although different standards have been established by treaties and Conventions, the main trend of
current international practice points in the direction of strict liability); WALLACE, supra note 12, at 167 (listing
consent, reprisal, distress, necessity and self-defense as some examples of recognized defense pleas which may be
utilized by a state to deny responsibility). For examples of valid defenses see also ILC, Draft Article on State
Responsibility; Article 29-33., H YEARBOOK ILC (1980) (citing lawful countermeasures, consent, distress,
necessity, and self-defense as example which may preclude wrongfulness in international law).
271. See Barboza, supra note 254 (explaining another example of responsibility exists which is not based on
any breach of obligation by states, but arises independently through general principles of law and equity). This
theory of non-wrongful liability has been adopted by the ILC as a basis of its topic 'International Liability for
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Such a principle is characterized by liability arising from lawful activities on the
basis of the mere causal link between these activities and the damage done. 72
Therefore, the plaintiff does not have to prove anything except a casual connection
between the activity in question and the damage suffered.27 Liability without fault
has been generally used to deter dangerous activities while not entirely prohibiting
benefits they may have. Thus, the rationale of strict liability is that whoever engages
in activities that might have an inherent risk of injury-such as those classified as
hazardous activities-is liable for injuries caused to third parties, even without
evidence of negligence or breach of international law.' For this reason, such form
of liability is, by its own nature, objective and absolute.Y7
Today a general rule of international law exists that binds the States to oversee
activities within their jurisdiction or control so that such activities do not cause
significant environmental harm, either to the territory or resources of other States,
or to common spaces or resources.276 The breach of this rule may occur either
Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law.' Id The underlying thesis for the
Commission's work is that an alternative conceptual basis is needed in order to accommodate strict or absolute
liability for lawful activities which cause environmental harm without any failure of due diligence, and to allow
for the continuation of such harmful but socially useful activities. Id. Many critics believe that this is not an
alternative theory but is based on responsibility for a breach of obligation. Id; see also Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra
note 38, at 509-12. Strict Liability for dangerous activities is present in national legal systems all over the world,
as well as in a number of international treaties. See Barboza, supra note 254. A strict liability regime is provided
in the oil pollution conventions; in both the Paris and Vienna conventions on nuclear damage; in the draft protocol
of the Basel Convention. Id
272. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 509, 510-12; see generally, A.E. Boyle, State Responsibility
and International Liability for Injurious Consequences ofActs Not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary
Distinction?, 39 INT'L & COMP.L.Q. 1, 1-26. (1990); see also International Law Commission, Survey of Liability
Regimes Relevant to the Topic of International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N.Doc. A/CN. 4/471.
273. See Soto, supra note 230, at 203. In some instances absolute liability states no cause of justification is
possible, and a state would be liable even for an act of God. Id
274. See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Sept. 1, 1972),
reprinted in (visited Mar. 1, 1999) <http:l/www.mfts.edulfletcherlmulti/texts/BH595.txt> (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer). The sole example with a clear rule of State's absolute liability is the 1972 Convention on
International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects, article 11 of which provides that "a State which
launches a space object is liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the
Earth or to aircraft in flight." Id
275. See A.E. Boyle 1990, supra note 272 and accompanying text (discussing objective liability); see also
C. Tomuschat, International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited By
International Law: The Work of the International Law Commission, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBIHrrY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM, (Francioni Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds. 1991) reprinted in BROWN WEISS Er AL.,
supra note 2, at 150 (citing C. Tomuschat explaining that the concept of responsibility without fault has been much
debated and not generally accepted because it's been made abundantly clear that the governing element in an
environmental regime providing for international liability attributable to the State shall be the objective fact of harm
having occurred).
276. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 509-12.
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directly2" or indirectly.27 8 However, in both cases, the obligation of the State
appears limited by the rule of due diligence.2 9
C. Applicability of General Principles as Limited by Rule of Due Diligence
There exists in general international law, real and binding primary obligations
of the States on the protection of the environment whose breach involves
responsibility for a wrongful act.' These real and binding obligations are limited
by the due diligence rule.28' This is particularly evident in a State's responsibility
to prevent damage from transboundary pollution.'
However, even in the most uncommon situation of wrongful acts directly
committed by State organs, or by agencies or bodies dependent on the State,
responsibility of the state for its own conduct occurs for breach of due diligence
obligations.28 International law does not place a negative obligation on the States
to refrain, but rather a positive obligation to protect.2" But the active measures that
the State must adopt cannot guarantee a certain result. Objective elements are
strongly unpredictable. 5 Therefore it is logical that international law place only on
the State the obligations to "make every effort" to reach this result.2
There are several basis where international responsibility is applicable in all
circumstances, the nature of how it applies depends upon the particular obligations
in question. 2  The obligation of due diligence, approaches the arena of strict
277. Directly means owing to wrongful behavior of State organs, or of dependent agencies and bodies of the
State. See MCCAFFaEY, supra note 35, at 504-09 (discussing state responsibility).
278. Id. at 504-09. Indirectly means owing to the State's breach of the obligation to prevent and repress the
polluting activities of private persons.
279. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 509-12 (explaining that one should consider due diligence as
an objective and international standard of behavior). The enactment of internationally agreed standards has been
defined with greater precision, as conduct that is expected of a good government. Id.
280. See U at510-11 (stating responsibility follows abreach of international law); see also Eduardo Jimfnez
de Ardchaga, supra note 247, at 531,561 (noting due diligence is a state responsibility in regards to their conduct).
281. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 509-12; see also Report of the International Law Commission,
The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
236-37, U.N. Doc A149/10 (1994) (defining due diligence as "a diligence proportioned to the magnitude of this
subject and to the dignity and strength of the power which is exercising it... and such care as governments
ordinarily employ in theirdomestic concerns"); BWNE&BOYLE, supra note 16, at 92-94 (addressing due diligence
with the duty to not cause transboundary harm).
282. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 510-12 (commenting on due diligence in regards to state
obligations and liability); see also BIRNrE & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 141-42 (describing the law of state
responsibility, fault and due diligence).
283. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 509-12.
284. See Id.
285. See Id,
286. Forfurtherreadingon general rules of international responsibility for environmental harm, see generally
INOERNAoNAL RESPONSIBILrrYFOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARm (Francesco Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds. 1991).
287. See Soto, supra note 230, at 203 (commenting on the lack of a general rule for liability when engaging
in ultra-hazardous activities); see also I L OPPENHEIM NTERNAONAL LAW 509 (1955) (supporting the theory
of no general rule in international law when engaging in ultra-hazardous activities).
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liability when the state is handling inherently dangerous material that has a
substantial likelihood to cause irreparable damage to the environment. 2 Nuclear
material present an extremely dangerous and potentially deadly threat to the
environment and humans. Therefore, strict liability for extremely dangerous
activities can be considered a general principle of law since it is found in municipal
legislation and treaties. 9
D. Responsibility of States to Refrain from Transboundary Harm
The possession of rights involves the performance of corresponding
obligations.2' The basis of this obligation is explained as maxim sic utere tuo, et
alienum non laedai 9' which is considered to be the international principle that
places an obligation on states to prohibit activities within their territory that are
contrary to the rights of other states which, could harm other states or their
inhabitants.2' 9 The obligation of all states to protect the rights of other states, was
first elaborated in the case of Trail Smelter.293 The court held that under the
principles of international law no state has the right to use or permit the use of
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of
another of the properties or persons therein, when the case entails serious
consequences and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence. 294 A
288. See Soto, supra note 230, at 203-04 (noting the level of liability for ultra-hazardous activities).
289. See Report of the International Law Commission, The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, U.N. GAOR 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A149/10 (1994); International
Convention for the Prevention of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954,327 U.N.T.S. 3, (1954), reprinted in (visited Mar.
1, 1999) <http.//www.tufts.edu.fletcher/multi/texts/tre-0130.txt> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer);
see generally notes 227-317 and accompanying text (discussing international environmental law as well as the
treaties, agreements, and court decisions which have upheld the duty not to cause transboundary harm as
approaching strict liability).
290. See generally Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (S. Afr. v. Namib.), 1971 LCJ. 16
(Advisory opinion of June 21).
291. The latin phrase translates: "So use your own property as not to injure that of another." BALLETINE'S
LAW DIcTONARY 1178 (3d ed. 1969).
292. The maxim was invoked as a rule by the LCJ in the Case Concerning the Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung v. Slovk.), 1997 I.CJ. 3. See Eva M. Kornicker, State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and Protection of
the Global Environment: Developing Criteria for Peremptory Norms, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTEL. L REV. 101,125-28
(1998) (discussing the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case). The principle not to cause transboundary harm was also
adopted in Corfu Channel (U.K v. Alb.), 1949 LCJ. 4 at 22 (Apr. 9); see also Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v.
Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 285 (Nov. 16, 1957); see also Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20; Rio Declaration, supra note
48 (recognizing the duty not to cause transboundary harm as a general principle of international environmental law);
see generally BROWN WEISS Er AL, supra note 2, at 270-88 (fully discussing the Lac Lanoux case).
293. Trial Smelter, (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911, 1965 (Apr. 16, 1938 & Mar. 11, 1941).
294. IdM The Trail Smelter rule has also been increasingly widely accepted as a statement of customary
international law generally applicable to cases of pollution, including media other than air. See, e.g., 2
RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OFTHE FOREIGNRELATIONS OFLAWOFTHEUNTED STATES §601 reps. note 1 (1987); KiSs
& SHELTON, supra note 222, at 125 (asserting Trail Smelter decision as affirming existence of rule of international
law forbidding transfrontier pollution); see also Gunther Hand, International Liability of States for Marine
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more general version of the harm preventing principle was adopted by the ICJ in its
1949 Corfu Channel decision.29 In this case the court concluded that every state has
an obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other states.296 This principle was further developed in 1961 when the
United Nations General Assembly declared that the fundamental principles of
international law impose a responsibility on all states concerning actions which
might have harmful biological consequences for the existing and future generations
of peoples of other states, by increasing the levels of radioactive fallout.297 This duty
to avoid environmental damage is internationally recognized and accepted in
numerous treatiess as well as in other international practices. 299 The first step in
Pollution, 21 CAN. Y.B. INT'LL 85,90 n.25 (1983) (affirming TrailSmelter's decision as establishing a customary
international legal obligation that pollution not interfere significantly with other state's uses of seas); see also
Gunther Handl, Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transnational Pollution, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 50, 60-66
(1975) (summarizing the debate over whether the Trail Smelter tribunal adopts a negligence or strict liability
standard); but see Oscar Schachter, The Emergence of International Environmental Law, 44 J. INT'L AFF. 457,462
(1991)'(expressing a contrasting opinion that Trail Smelter is accepted as a statement of customary international
law, is not universally held). "['r]o assert categorically that (international environmental) principles have become
customary law would require the evidence of general state practice and opinio juris. Such evidence is only
fragmentary. Principle 21 of the Stockholm [D]eclaration is, at best, a starting point. On its own terms, it has not
become state practice: States generally do not ensure that the activities within theirjurisdiction do not cause damage
to the environments of others. Nor have governments give any significant indication that they regard this far-
reaching principle as binding customary law." Id.
295. Corfu Channel (U.K v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4 at 22 (Apr. 9).
296. See id, This case is different from Trail Smelter, in that Corfu Channel dealt with a nation's obligation
to warn other nations that mines existed in its territorial waters. l4 Several conflicting views have been expressed
as to whether the principle announced in Corfu Channel applies to state's responsibility not to cause transboundary
pollution. See also BtRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 90 (arguing that the principle in Corfu Channel does not
apply to the principle announced in Trail Smelter); but see Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Overview of the Existing
Customary Legal Regime Regarding International Pollution, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLLIMTION 63-64
(Daniel Barstow Magraw ed., 1988) (strongly endorsing the argument that the principles announced in the Trail
Smelter arbitration are supported by the Corfu Channel decision).
297. See Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, G.A. Res.
1629 (XVI), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16A, at 241-242, U.N. Doc. A/4684/Add.1 (1961) (recognizing
"fundamental principles of international law impose a responsibility on all States concerning actions which might
have harmful biological consequences for the existing and future generations.. ."); see also Development and
Environment, G.A. Res. 2849 (XXVI), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(Dec. 20,1972) (noting the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources).
298. See generally Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, art. I(l)(b), 480 U.N.T.S 43, reprinted in (visited Mar. 1, 1999)
<http.//www.tufts.edu/fletcher/multi/texts/BH454.txt> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (prohibiting
nuclear testing); see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 193, 21 I.L.M. 1245
(1982) (stating that the obligation to prevent environmental harm is not only a negative obligation; there should also
be positive actions towards environmental protection). Id.; see also Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific, Nov. 12, 1981. art. 3(5), reprinted in (visitedMar.1, 1999)
<http://www.tufts.edu/fletcher/multi/textsbh8O9.txt> (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (establishing
that all Parties to the Convention must take "all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction
or control are so conducted that they do not cause damage by pollution to others or to their environment").
299. See generally International Responsibility of States in Regard to the Environment, G.A. Res. 2996
(XXVI), U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972) (discussing principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration as laying down the principle of international responsibility of states in regard to the
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acceding the responsibility to refrain from transboundary harn3°° was
internationally recognized as a general principle of international environmental law
with the Stockholm Declaration.
1. The Stockholm Declaration-Principle 21
International law has been developed to provide protection for the
environment. The evolution of international environmental law is represented by the
Stockholm Declaration. Even though the Stockholm Declaration is a non-binding
text, it serves as a basis for the development of international environmental law
in the form of numerous conventions, bilateral as well as mutual.302 Moreover,
certain principles articulated in the Declaration are considered by scholars to reflect
rules of customary international environmental law.3 3 Article 21 represents the
fundamental principle which the commentators of the Declaration consider part of
customary international law.' The principle sets forth the obligation that States in
accordance with the principles of international law, have the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.305
Although this principle reaffirms the fundamental principles of international
law of state sovereignty over natural resources, it combines with the equally
environment); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp.
No. 31, art. 30, at 55 (1974) (establishing all States have the responsibility to preserve, protect and enhance the
environment for the present and future generations); Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 14 LL.M. 1292 (1975).
300. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20, at princ. 21 (discussing Transboundary Pollution as the
transmission of a physical agent from the territory of one state that causes harm in the territory of another or in the
areas beyond national jurisdiction).
301. See Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Hwnan Environment, 14 HARV. IN'L LJ. 423,
515 (1973) (giving an analysis of the drafting history of the Stockholm Declaration).
302. See Note by Executive Secretary, UNEP Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity (visited Jan. 18,1999) <http.//www.biodiv.org/cop4/4-20/COP4-20e.html> (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer); see also Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Ch. III., Ar. 30, at 48 (1974), reprinted in 14 LL.M. 25 (1975); see also Preparatory Committee for
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Principles on General Rights and Obligations.
China and Pakistan [on Behalf of the Group of 771: Draft Decision, Rio de Janeiro Charter/Declaration on
Environment and Development, at 1, Principle 21, U.N. Dec. A/CONF 151/PC/WG.ITL.20/Rev. 1 (1992).
303. This is the particular case with Principle 21 relating to the responsibility of States for transboundary
pollution, a topic discussed in this section in more detail. See KiSs & SHELTON, supra note 222, at 40; see also
Bwyrm & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 89-92.
304. See supra note 301-02 and accompanying text (setting forth Principle 21 as a fundamental principle of
international environmental law).
305. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20; see also Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 222, at 40-45
(providing analysis of this principle, which Kiss & SHELTON characterize as a "fundamental principle" of the
"international common of the environment").
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fundamental principle of environmental responsibility of States, which qualifies the
exercise of their sovereignty over their natural resources. 
3W
Since its affirmation, Principle 21 has been adopted in numerous treaties,
conventions, and agreements in international law.3 Its prodigious acceptance
within international environmental law only lends weight to its acquired force as a
substantive rule of customary international law.' Today, Principle 21's focus on
international environmental law has expanded from an emphasis on bilateral,
transboundary pollution to include resource problems in areas completely under
national jurisdiction and threats to the global commons other than purely
transboundary pollution.3°9 Cumulation of the twenty years of expansion in
international environmental law from the Stockholm Declaration was synthesized
by Principle 21's reaffirmation with Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration.
2. The Rio Declaration-Principle 2
A general duty not to cause environmental damage to the environment of other
states, or to areas beyond a state's national jurisdiction, promulgated in Principle
21 of the Stockholm Declaration30 ° was affirmed in the 1992 Rio Declaration. 311 The
principle of responsibility is found in second place among the twenty-seven
principles of the Declaration, no longer in twenty-first as in the Stockholm
Declaration. 32 This may lead to the conclusion that the principle of international
responsibility of the states to refrain from causing transboundary pollution acquired
greater weight in the Rio Declaration.3 3 Unfortunately, one discovers more
306. See WAU.AC, supra note 12, at 188-89. Principle 21 from the Stockholm Declaration, encompasses two
fundamental principles of international environmental law. l First, states have sovereign rights over their natural
resources. 1d Second, states must not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. Id; see also Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20, at princ. 21 (adopting duty not to cause
transboundary harm as a general principle of international environmental law).
307. See David A. Wirth. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: 7wo Steps Forward and
One Bac, or Wce Versa?, 29 GA. L.REV. 599,620 n. 57 (1995) (providing a thorough and comprehensive research
on the adoption of Principle 21 in international Conventions and Treaties).
308. See infra notes 323, 333 and accompanying text (supporting the duty not to cause transboundary harm
as a principle of customary law).
309. See generally Wirth, supra note 307 (noting the expansion of Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration).
310. See id (providing for a comparative analysis of the Stockholm and Rio Declarations); see also Rance
ILL. Panjabi, From Stockholm to Rio: A Comparison of the Declaratory Principles of International Environmental
Law, 21 DEN. L INT'LL & POL'Y 215,289 (1993).
311. See Rio Declaration, supra note 48, at princ. 2.
312. See Marc Pallemaerts, International Environmental Law in the Age of Sustainable Development: A
CriticalAssessment of the UNCED Process, 15 J.L & COM. 623, 636-41 (1996) (inquiring whether the jump from
principle 21 in the Stockholm Declaration to principle 2 in the Rio Declaration, means that the principle of
international responsibility of the states for transboundary pollution has acquired greater importance?).
313. See id (proclaiming that instead of acquiring greater importance, Principle 2 actually contains a
regression skillfully disguished under the appearance of an upgrading); see also infra notes 316-17 (arguing both
sides).
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questions than answers upon analyzing Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. One
argument states that Principle 2 represents the modification that potentially
authorizes states to depart from the development of the Stockholm Declaration.
3 14
On the opposite side, others argue that Principle 2 changes nothing except for a
recognition of the needs of developing countries. s
Principle 2 declares, states have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other states or areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction?"' The text is identical to Principle 21 in the Stockholm
Declaration, with one very significant difference. The Rio version stipulates that
"States have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources" not only "pursuant
to their own environmental policies" which already was included in the Stockholm
version but also according to their "developmental policies. 317
Therefore, the only thing the Rio Declaration adds along with analyzing the
sovereign rights of State over their resources in the ecological context, the Rio
Declaration includes a developmental policies analysis. 8 Thus, Principle 2 of the
Rio Declaration has not changed the fundamental principle to refrain from causing
transboundary harm, but has adapted with the times, by recognizing the importance
of a State's developmental policies.
V. APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL
HARM IN ESTONIA
Responsibility arises from the simple fact that the environment is an important
aspect of a healthy life. Without a healthy environment there can be no healthy
people, economy, or government.
314. See Wirth, supra note 307, at 623-24 (arguing that the revision of Principle 21 is "an abrupt
discontinuity in the development of law in this perennially sensitive area, a modification that at least potentially
authorizes states to depart from the Stockholm Declaration"); see also Pallemaerts, supra note 312, at 636-42
(noting the differences between Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration).
315. See generally Pallemaerts, supra note 312, at 636-41 (asserting that "the modification of Principle 21
does not materially change its meaning or effect," but "simply states that which was previously unstated but
universally accepted").
316. See Rio Declaration, supra note 48, at princ. 2.
317. See Note by Executive Secretary, UNEP Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, supra note 302 (reproducing in its Article 3, under the neutral-sounding title of "principle," Principle 21
of the Stockholm Declaration in its original version).
318. See Pallemaerts, supra note 312, at 637-38 (discussing the addition of "developmental" policy to
principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which establishes the duty not to cause transboundary harm).
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This section of the Comment explores the applicability of general principles of
international responsibility for environmental harm;319 specifically between
Estonian and Russia explained above.3' An analysis of the Troop Withdrawal
Agreement signed between Estonia and Russia is discussed first for the purpose of
determining if Estonia waived their right to hold Russia responsible for the
environmental harm to their land.21
A. The Effect of the Troop Withdrawal Agreement (Russia-Estonia)
The Troop Withdrawal Agreement between the Republic of Estonia and the
Russian Federation was signed at Moscow July 26, 1994.322 An important factor in
the signing of the agreement was the significance of the preamble, which stated that
both parties were guided by internationally recognized principles and norms of
international law.32 General principles and norms of international law may be
inserted into undeveloped areas of the treaty to avoid undermining its principle
objective.3 24 Therefore, where situations arise and the treaty does not cover the
actions that may be taken, general principles and norms of international law may
be used in creating a solution.
Article 19 states that when disputes arise damages are to be reviewed by a joint
commission formed on the basis of Article 21." To resolve disputes the joint
commission is to operate on the regulations established by the commission itself326
Furthermore, the agreement aspired to establish a contractual basis for which the
resolution of issues relating to the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Estonia
319. See generally P. M., Dupuy, The International Law of State Responsibility: Revolution or Evolution?,
11 MICH.J.INT'L L. 105 (1989) (expanding on the evolving principles governing responsibility under international
law).
320. This comment does not explore the ability of Russia to pay any compensation to Estonia for the
environmental damage to their land, but advocates the application of general principles of international
environmental law to the occupying power of one state upon another, when the occupying power harms the
environment of the state they are occupying.
321. See Borger, supra note I (discussing the possibility of Estonia waiving all claims against Russia in the
Troop Withdrawal Agreement); see also Trei, supra note 110 (stating Estonia waived all rights against Russia in
the Troop Withdrawal Agreement).
322. See Troop Withdrawal Agreement, supra note 142 (providing a copy of an unofficial translation of the
agreement between Estonia and Russia).
323. See Troop Withdrawal Agreement, supra note 142, at preamble.
324. See WALLACE supra note 12, at 21-22 (supporting the theory of "plugging in" general principles of
international law where the law is deficient).
325. See Troop Withdrawal Agreement, supra note 142, at art. 19(4). Article 19(4) states, "[d]isputes arising
between the Parties related to compensation of damages shall be reviewed by a joint commission which shall be
formed on the basis of Article 21 of the present Treaty." Id.
326. See id at art. 21. Article 21 states, "[a] joint commission to which each Party shall designate an equal
number of representatives shall be formed to resolve matters related to the present Treaty and to its application. Id.
The joint commission shall operate based on regulations established by the commission." Id.
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could be based.327 During the withdrawal of Soviet military forces, no disputes
arose, therefore application of these articles do not apply to the damages of the
environment that the Soviet military effectuated during their fifty years of
occupation.
An important determination of whether Estonia maintains a cause of action to
hold Russia responsible for the harm of the environment under the treaty is how
long it was to remain in effect. The agreement states that it was to remain in effect
until such time as the Soviet military forces had been completely withdrawn from
the territory of the Republic of Estonia.328 All Armed Forces of the Soviet military
departed from Estonia on August 31, 1994, except for approximately two thousand
whom had retired from the military and chose to remain.3' If this is so, any
contractual binding clauses waiving Estonia's right to seek indemnification for
violation of international environmental law would be inapplicable for a claim
brought today. This is an easy argument, opening the door to Estonia's right to hold
Russia responsible for the environmental harm. But if the treaty is found to apply
to a claim brought today, did Estonia waive their right to hold Russia responsible
under Article 8 of the treaty?
Article 8 of the Troop Withdrawal Agreement states that at the time the Treaty
enters into force all claims related to the presence of the Soviet military forces in
Estonia and damage caused ecologically or other, shall be considered settled in
full. 330 But Article 9(2), states that the Armed forces shall transfer all military sites
to the Republic of Estonia cleared of explosive, poisonous and other
environmentally polluting substances. '3 ' Both Parties to this Treaty knew "shall"
within the meaning of law and treaties predicates that the Armed Forces must
transfer all military sites to Estonia cleared of explosive, poisonous and other
environmentally polluting substances. Upon departure of the Armed Forces from
the Sillamie Uranium dump, Paldiski Naval base, and numerous other bases, severe
and massive amounts of environmental damage were discovered and remained on
the site to be cleaned by the Republic of Estonia.332 This is a clear breach of Article
327. See id at preamble. The relevant section ofthe preamble postulates the Parties, "endeavoring to establish
a contractual basis for the resolution of issues related to the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation from the territory of the Republic of Estonia and conditions for their temporary presence until such time
as the withdrawal has been completed... ." l
328, See id. at. art. 22. Article 22 (establishing that "[t]he present Treaty ... shall remain in force until such
time as the Armed Forces have been completely withdrawn from the territory of the Republic of Estonia").
329. See Trei, supra note 110 (stating that several hundred Russians chose to remain in Estonia after the
majority of the troops withdrew).
330. See Ycop Withdrawal Agreement, supra note 142, at art. 8. Article 8 (stating all monetary, property
and other claims by the Parties related to the presence of Armed Forces on the territory of the Republic of Estonia,
including ecological and other damage caused by the Armed Forces, shall be considered to be settled in full as of
the moment the present Treaty enters into force).
331. See id. at Article 9(2.1). Article 9(2.1) (establishing that "[t]he Armed Forces shall transfer all military
sites to the Republic of Estonia cleared of explosive, poisonous and other environmentally polluting substances").
332. See supra Sections II.B.C. and Section H. (discussing the damage to Paldiski).
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9(2.1), because the Russian Federation agreed to transfer all military sites to Estonia
cleared of environmentally polluting substances 3 Sillamde has a uranium lake
lying just 10 meters from the Baltic Sea.3  Paldiski had two nuclear reactors which
the Russian Federation did clear away, but left the land surrounding the base
polluted by tons of waste from operating the nuclear reactors.35 Therefore, by
breaching Article 9(2.1), which was an absolute requirement according to the
Treaty, render Article 8's waiver for the environmental damage inapplicable?
The waiver clause under Article 8 also includes the term "shall., 336 The "shall"
refers to all claims to be considered in full as of the moment the Treaty enters into
force.37 Russia obviously breached Article 9(2.1), but since the waiver inserted into
Article 8 is laid out before Article 9(2.1), does this preclude any claim brought
under Article 9(2.1)? Clearly, arguments can be articulated for both sides. 38 The
Russians would argue that since Article 8 was laid out before Article 9(2.1), the
Estonians are precluded from bringing a claim under the Treaty for breach of
Article 9(2.1). The Estonians would indubitably expatiate on the fact that Article
9(2.1) required the Russian military forces to vacate all military bases cleared of
explosive, poisonous and other environmentally polluting substances, otherwise this
Article would not have been inserted into the Treaty. Furthermore, they would
contend that full compliance with Article 9(2.1), qualifies Article 8's waiver of all
claims against Russia during their period of occupation, therefore they can bring a
claim for breaching the Article. Arguments could go back in forth as to whether
Estonia waived its right to hold Russia responsible for the environmentally
polluting substance remaining on the bases after they withdrew from Estonia under
Article 8, or whether Russia can be held responsible for breaching the Treaty under
Article 9(2.1).
This Comment is not concerned with the answer to these questions as to
whether Estonia waived their right to bring a claim for breach of the Treaty under
Article 8, or whether Article 9(2.1) allows a claim to be brought. The existence of
the Treaty had to be acknowledged, because if Estonia brought a claim against
Russia seeking to hold them responsible for the environmental damage the above
arguments would surely be put forth. Acknowledging the existence of the Treaty,
but disregarding the debates that Estonia may have waived its right to hold Russia
responsible, this Comment will apply the general principles of environmental law
333. See Troop Withdrawal Agreement, supra note 142, at art. 9(2.1).
334. See supra Section II.B. (detailing the environmental damage to the land surrounding the Sillame
uranium waste plant).
335. See supra Section II.A. (reporting the extensive damage left behind on the former naval base in
Paldiski).
336. See Troop Withdrawal Agreement, supra note 142, at art. 8.
337. See id.
338. See Ann MacLachlan, Estonia To Take Thle To Cleaned E-Soviet Nuclear Training Site, NUCLEONICS
Wa, Sept. 7, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7929144 (articulating arguments that may be brought on both sides).
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as recognized under the Stockholm339 and Rio Declaration uo to the environmental
damage ofEstonia.341 Therefore, even though the agreement may not be enforceable
against any claim Estonia has against the Russian Federation, it does leave open the
door to apply general principles of accountability and responsibility to the
environmental damage the Armed Forces inflicted upon Estonian land.
B. Applying General Principles of Responsibility Recognized under
International Environmental Law to an Occupying Power for the
Environmental Harm of Estonia
Applying general principles of international environmental law is necessary to
deter an occupying power from causing environmental harm to the occupied
territory. Furthermore, holding the occupying power responsible under the general
principle to refrain from causing transboundary harm to the environment is essential
to protect the surrounding countries from environmental harm.
On the basis of a broad comparison of treaty law, international resolutions, and
regional practice, it seems possible to define the well-established principle not to
cause transboundary pollution as follows:3 2 (1) States, in the exercise of their
sovereign right, pursuant to their developmental policies, may exploit and use their
natural resources.l 3 (2) However, States shall take into account the impact of actual
or anticipated activities in areas placed under their jurisdiction or control on the
environment situated national frontiers.3" (3) Furthermore, States shall take, in
good faith and with all due diligence, appropriate measures to prevent
transboundary pollution by establishing, rules and procedures adapted to the
requirements of the protection of the environment, and see the laws effectively
applied. s
The principle to further refrain from transboundary harm in international
environmental law can be broken down into three general elements.346 First, states
339. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20, at princ. 21; see also BIIE & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 91
(setting forth that many conventions at Principle 21 was announced, point to international acceptance of the
proposition that states are now required to protect global common areas). Principle 21 as applied to subsequent
lawmaking and judicial precedents requires states to do more than make reparation for environmental damage. Id.
at 92.
340. See Rio Declaration, supra note 48, at princ. 2
341. See supra Sections H.C. and 1I.A.B. (detailing examples of the environmental damage the Russian
occupation had upon Estonia).
342. See P.M. Dupuy, supra note 22, at 333; see also WALLACE, supra note 12, at 188-90 (noting several
treaties and resolutions which have adopted the fundamental principle not to cause transboundary harm).
343. See i&!
344. See Id
345. See P.M. Dupuy, supra note 22, at 333.
346. See generally Soto, supra note 230 (discussing sovereignty and responsibility in international
environmental law).
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have sovereign rights over their own natural resources. 347 Second, states shall
refrain from causing transboundary harm. 4 Third, states in good faith and with all
due diligence, should undertake appropriate measures to prevent transboundary
harm and enforce these measures.4 9 These three principle elements have been
accepted by tribunals as a reflection of international customs3 ° and affirmed in
international agreements in regards to international environmental law.35
1. States Sovereign Rights to Exploit and Use Their Own Natural Resources
Estonia was an independent nation when the USSR volitionally occupied
Estonia under the threat of severe retaliation from the Soviet military if they did not
acquiesce. 352 Thereafter the USSR occupied Estonia for the next fifty years,
exploiting and using Estonia's natural resources.353 But, did the USSR establish a
sovereign right to exploit and use Estonia's natural resources?354
A sovereign right is a right which the state alone can possess, and which it
possesses in the character of a sovereign, for the common benefit, and to enable it
to carry out its proper functions.3 55 Estonia's argument would be the former USSR
was not a sovereign, therefore never gained the right to exploit and use Estonia's
natural resources. Sovereignty is the supreme, absolute and uncontrollable power
by which any independent state is governed.3 56 Estonia was not an independent state
during the USSR occupation, therefore the USSR never established itself as a
sovereign power. In the alternative, if the former USSR established itself as a
347. See Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N.
GAOR, 17th Sess., A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 228, at 512-13 (detailing the principle
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is supported by the body ofjus cogens). Jus Cogens is the attempt
to form a boy of law which classifies rights as fundamental or inherent. Id.
348. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20, at princ. 21; see also Rio Declaration, supra note 48. at princ.
2.
349. See P.M. Dupuy, supra note 22, at 332-33.
350. See generally Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libya, Arab Republic
53 I.L.R. 389.
351. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20; see also Rio Declaration, supra note 48; P.M. Dupuy, supra
note 22, at 333 (declaring that the principle to refrain from causing transboundary harm, is a fundamental principle
which seems to have been accepted by the actual world community of States); BIRNm &BoYLE, supra note 16, at
91 (stating that principle 21 has had influence within United Nations resolutions, in UNEP principle, and in
multilateral treaties such as the London Dumping Convention, the Geneva Convention, or the Basel Convention
on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes).
352. See supra Section H.B. (detailing the hostile occupation of Estonia).
353. See generally ESTONTA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 18-23.
354. See BROWNLIE, supra note 228, at 109-10 (discussing sovereignty and territory). Sovereign rights
generally tend to refer to the power to take title to territory and the rights accruing from exercise of the power, i
at 289.
355. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990) (elaborating that a state's sovereign right is
distinguished from such "proprietary" rights as a state, like any private person, may have in property or demands
which it owns).
356. See id. (defining sovereignty).
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sovereign, Estonia would claim their right was not exercised for the common
benefit. To rebut the USSR's counter argument that they exercised their sovereign
right for the common benefit, Estonia would contend the former USSR failed to
adhere to the will of the people, which created the common benefit.357 Therefore,
the USSR exercised their sovereign right for the common benefit of their nation and
not the for the common benefit of the people of Estonia.35 Thus, breaching the
requirement of state's responsibility to adhere to the fundamental right of exercising
one's sovereign right to exploit and use its natural resources to the will of the
people. 359
2. States Shall Refrain From Causing Transboundary Harm
The world community seems to have accepted the fundamental principle of a
State's responsibility to refrain from causing transboundary pollution. 6  This
principle has been accepted in many States, among which, Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration are the most
important. These principles establish the international duty to not cause substantial
harm through transboundary pollution in the jurisdiction of another state.361
The obligation of a state to refrain from causing transboundary pollution was
first found in the Trail Smelter case,362 and later adopted by the ICJ in the Corfu
Channel case.-3 The decision in the Trial Smelter case was finally announced in
1941.364 The USSR had completely occupied Estonia by 1941, therefore they were
on notice that a duty to refrain from causing transboundary pollution existed in
357. See ESTONIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 18.22 (detailing once the USSR established occupation
within Estonia, they reformed their government to the will of the USSR).
358. See d.
359. See BIRNM & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 89 (relating that states are required by international law to take
adequate steps to control and regulate sources of serious global environmental pollution or transboundary harm
within their territory or subject to their jurisdiction).
360. See P.M. Dupuy, supra note 22, at 333 (noting that the duty not to cause substantial harm through
transboundary pollution in the area under the jurisdiction of another State may be deemed to have been explicitly
accepted in many collective statements of States).
361. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20, atprinc. 21; Rio Declaration, supra note 48, atprinc. 2; see
also P.M. Dupuy, supra note 22, at 334.
362. See Trial Smelter, (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.IA.A. 1905, 1965 (Apr. 16, 1938 & Mar. 11, 1941) (holding
the duty to not cause transhoundary harm as a general principle of international law; see also BROWN WEISS ETAL,
supra note 155, at 246-50 (detailing the general holding of the TrailSmelter arbitration); see also WALLACE, supra
note 12, at 189.
363. See Corfu Channel (U.K v. Alb.), 1949 LCJ. 4, 22 (Apr. 9) (establishing international responsibility
for explosion of mines in territorial waters) ; see also BROWN WEISS ET AL., supra note 155, at 263-67 (explaining
the case and holding of the Corfu Channel case); WALLACE, supra note 12, at 189 (noting Corfu Channel
establishes international responsibility on every state "not to allow knowingly its terrtory to be used for acts
contrary to the rights of other states").
364. See Trial Smelter, (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (Apr. 16, 1938 & Mar. 11, 1941); see also
BROwN WEISS ETAL, supra note 155, at 246-50.
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international law.o During the next fifty years of occupation, the USSR explicitly
ignored this fundamental obligation. This is evidenced by looking at the
environmental disaster situated on the former military bases within Estonia.m6
Specifically, the greatest amount of damage to the environment is on the former
naval base in Paldiski and the uranium waste facility in Sillamee.' Estonia
declared independence from Russia in 1991. Eight years later in 1999, Estonia is
still cleaning up the damage to the surrounding environment from the Soviet
occupation.3
The USSR had a duty to refrain from causing transboundary pollution upon
Estonia. Since they ignored this fundamental principle, they should be held
responsible for the cleanup.' Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,
establishes that States have a duty in their jurisdiction and to those under its
contro3 7 to refrain from causing transboundary pollution.37 During occupation,
Estonia was under the control of the USSR. Therefore, the fundamental principle
of prevention implies that the USSR must consider what can or could be the
eventual interferences of present and anticipated activities on the environment
situated in the territory of other States.372 Obviously, from the environmental
damage to the Estonia land and surrounding Baltic Sea"3 the USSR never observed
nor took into consideration the harm their actions would cause to the environment.
The USSR while controlling Estonia never gained sovereign rights to use and
exploit Estonia's natural resources. Therefore, the USSR is responsible for their
actions that created transboundary environmental damage upon Estonia's land.
365. See ESTONIA COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 6, at 18 (stating that the USSR had completely occupied
Estoniaby 1941,but later in the year the German's attacked and took control of Estonia, which after WWU in 1944,
the Soviets re-occupied Estonia).
366. See Section ULA.-B. (describing the environmental damage left behind from the Soviet occupation).
367. See id
368. See supra notes 127-49 and accompanying text (detailing the cost of cleaning up the environmental
damage left behind from the Soviet-Russian occupation).
369. See Stockholm Declaration, supma note 20, atprinc. 21 (establishing the general principle to refrain from
causing transboundary harm).
370. See McCaffrey, supra note 35, at 321 (noting the Precise legal definition of control in Principle 21, Is
not entirely clear and the reasonableness test must be applied); see also RESTATEMENT (THMRD) OP THE FOREIGN
REiAMONS LAW OF THE UNrITOSTAMS §403 (1986) (citing the reasonableness test). Some of the relevant factors
in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over an activity is the link of the activity to the territory of the
regulating state; "the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state
and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect; the character of the activity to be regulated; the existence ofjustified expectations
that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal,
or economic system; the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and the
likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state." Id
371. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20.
372. See P.M. Dupuy, supra note 22, at 335 (noting international customary law has not developed
sufficiently to define precisely what kind of procedures should be enforced by States to apply their general
obligation to prevent t-ansboundary harm).
373. See Section II.B.-C. and IH.A.-B. and accompanying text (explaining the Soviet disregard for the
environment and the resulting damage they wrought upon Estonia).
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Transboundary pollution is generally defined as any intentional or unintentional
pollution whose physical origin is subject to, and situated wholly or in part within
the area under, the national jurisdiction or control of one State and which has effects
in the area under the national jurisdiction of another State.374 There is an abundance
of evidence establishing severe environmental damage to Estonian land as a result
of the Soviet occupation.37' The environmental damage to the land occurred in
Estonia, while it was under the control and jurisdiction of the USSR. Before
occupation Estonia was an independent nation, during occupation it was under the
control and subject to jurisdiction of the USSR by force. After occupation, Estonia
reestablished itself as an independent nation. Therefore, since the USSR controlled
Estonia by force, any resulting damage by the USSR on Estonian land causes
transboundary pollution. Thus, the USSR breached the fundamental principle to
refrain from causing transboundary harm unless they can raise a valid defense.
3. States Duty of Good Faith and Due Diligence to Prevent Transboundary
Harm
International law recognizes a norm providing that states are to "exercise their
best efforts," use "all appropriate means" or "the best practicable means at their
disposal and in accordance with their capabilities' ,376 or "exercise due diligence" a3
to bring about a certain state of affairs. 78 These general principles of international
law are applicable to the fundamental duty to refrain from causing transboundary
pollution. Due diligence only requires States to take the necessary measures to
ensure that such activities, which in themselves are generally lawful, do not create
significant environmental harm. 79
374. See McCaffrey, supra note 35, at 239 (defining the OCED's definition of "transfrontier pollution").
375. See supra Section lI.A.-B. and accompanying text (describing the severe environmental damage to the
cities of Paldiski and Sillamle as a result of the Soviet occupation).
376. See Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Final Act, Oct 21, 1982, art. 194(1)(2)
21 LL.M 1245, 1308 (1982). Article 194(2), establishes the duty not to cause transbounday harm to another state.
It Specifically, this article adds that States have a duty to prevent pollution arising from incidents or activities
under theirjurisdiction or control from spreading beyond the areas where they have exercised their sovereign rights.
377. See BnmE & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 93 (citing flexibility as an advantages of due diligence as a
standard of conduct). Such factors as the "effectiveness of territorial control, the resources available to the state and
the nature of specific activities may all be taken into account and justify differing degrees of diligence." I4; see
generally Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its forty-sixth session, U.N. GAOR 46th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc A149/10 (1994) (discussing the Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, which supports the exercise of due diligence). Article 7 establishes the
obligation not to cause significant harm, which States must exercise with due diligence in their utilization of
intemational watercourse. Id at 236.
378. See P.M. Dupuy, supra note 22, at 336 (establishing the standard of international due diligence to be
the measure of international cooperation). Furthermore, due diligence is both counterpart to the exercise of
territorialjurisdiction and the limiting factoron international responsibility flowing from failure to act in accordance
with international norms. I
379. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 511; see also BIRNtE & BOYLE, supra note 16, at 92-4.
1999 / International Responsibility of an Occupying Power
The measure of due diligence by a state is a subjective principle determined by
looking at the surrounding facts of a situation. In both the cities of Sillam~ie and
Paldiski ultra-hazardous activities were conducted.S The general rule on the
flexibility of due diligence regarding high degree of damage requires the States to
exercise a particularly high degree of diligence in prevention.38' Prevention was not
exercised by the USSR, as evidence by the nuclear waste surrounding the former
naval base in Paldiski and the radioactive lake outside of the former uranium plant
in Sillamde.8 2 In such a case as this, the due diligence obligation approaches the
obligation of result.38 3 That is, to create a situation of presumption unfavorable to
the damaging state, approaching the standard of strict liability.3 ' The damage to the
Estonia environment from radioactive waste has already taken place. Therefore,
Russia is responsible for breaching its obligation of due diligence (a.k.a. good faith)
to refrain from causing transboundary harm.
VI. CONCLUSION
The duties of nations to responsibly control and regulate activities within
their borders, is the basis of the fundamental principle to refrain from causing
transboundary harm.3 5 In return, these responsibilities within the principle develop
into specific principles of national responsibility in international environmental law.
Therefore, international environmental law establishes a general duty to make sure
that an occupying powers' activities on the occupied nation's soil does not cause
serious environmental harms to that country. Thus, establishing a territorial
responsibility principle. 86
The assignment of specific national responsibility of an occupying power not
to harm the environment of the occupied country is consistent with the basis of a
380. See supra Section lH.A.-B. (detailing the extent of radioactive waste surrounding both Paldiski and
Sillamae).
381. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 511-12 (explaining the due diligence obligations tend to
approach an obligation of result, when the State are handling ultra-hazardous materials).
382. See supra Section M.A.-B. (showing that after the departure of the Soviet military, nuclear waste was
found to have cause severe environmental damage in both Sillamae and Paldiski).
383. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 38, at 512. The obligation of result is to create a situation of
presumption unfavorable to the damaging State. Id.
384. See id.
385. See Rio Declaration, supra note 48, at princ 2 (providing a sovereign the right to use their land and
resources as long as the activities within theirjurisdiction or control do not cause transboundary pollution). Id.; see
generally BROWN WEISS Er AL., supra note 155, at 173-74 (historically, customary international law has provided
that a sovereign state has jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its laws within its territorial borders).
386. See Trial Smelter Arbitration (U.S v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1938) (holding Canadians liable and
ordered to pay damages for pollution caused by privately owned smelter); id., at 1966 (establishing pollution control
regime for the same smelter); see also Stockholm Declaration, supra note 20, at princ. 21 (providing that states must
ensure that activities within their own jurisdiction do not damage areas beyond their jurisdiction); see generally
Arthur L Kuhn, Comment, The Trial Smelter Arbitration-United States and Canada, 32 AM. J. INT'L L 785
(1938).
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territorial responsibility principle. Upon recognition of this general principle nations
assume responsibility for preventing environmental harm to an occupied country
as if it was their territory. By establishing this idea as a general right among nations,
a general principle of international environmental law is born.
It is necessary to protect the rights of an occupied territory to a healthy
environment. Extending the application of the fundamental principle to refrain from
causing transboundary harm to an occupying nation is essential to protect the
environment of the occupied territory. Furthermore, applying this principle upon the
occupying nation reenforces the duty of an occupying power to respect the
environment of the occupied territory. Thus, establishing a positive principle to
protect and preserve the environment. Even though an occupying power does not
respect the rights of a once independent nation, the rights to a healthy environment
is universal. Therefore, not only should the general principle of international
environmental law to refrain from causing transboundary harm extend to cover the
actions from one state to another, but also of an occupying power to the occupied
nation.
The atrocity to the Estonian environment is magnified by the fact that Russia
has not been held responsible for the environmental damage. As Julian Borger"'
stated, "they were truly guests from hell." The Russian occupation of Estonia, is
surely the epitome of guests from hell. Therefore should they not be responsible for
the damage they wrought upon the Estonian environment during occupation?
387. See Borger, supra note 1.

